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ACRONYMS 
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DG DEV European Commission Directorate General for Development  OECD/DAC Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development/Development Assistance Committee  
DG RELEX European Commission Directorate General for External 
Relations 
QA Quality Assurance 
EC European Commission QC Quality Control 
ECHO European Community Humanitarian Aid Office REC Royal Engineer Corps 
ENPI European National Programme for Integration SFD Swiss Federation for Demining (same as FSD) 
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal TA Technical Advisor 
ERW Explosive Remnants of War UNHCR  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
EU European Union UNMAS United Nations Mine Action Service 
FSD Fondation Suisse de Déminage (same as SFD) UNDG United Nations Development Group 
GDP Gross Domestic Product UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
GICHD Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining UNDP/BCPR UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery 
HI Handicap International UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services 
IDP Internally Displaced Person USD United States Dollar 
IMAS International Mine Action Standards UXO Unexploded Ordnance 
IMSMA Information Management System for Mine Action VA Victim Assistance 
SOP Standard Operating Procedure VTF Voluntary Trust Fund (of the UN) 
Spot UXO Isolated UXO which does not impact a community even 
though it poses a possible threat 
VVAF Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation 
LIS Landmine Impact Survey WRF World Rehabilitation Forum 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
BACKGROUND 
In 2001 the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament adopted two Regulations on the 
reinforcement of the EU response against Antipersonnel Landmines (APL).1 These (referred to 
collectively as “the Regulation”) laid the foundation of an integrated and focused European 
policy. The Regulation states the need to regularly assess operations financed by the Community 
and that the European Commission (EC) shall submit to the European Parliament an overall 
assessment of all Community mine action. To implement these provisions, the EC commissioned 
a global assessment of EC mine policy and actions over the period 2002-2004 and entered into an 
agreement with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to, inter 
alia, manage the programme of regional evaluations to identify lessons learned within EC-funded 
mine action projects in the six regions, one of which is the Middle East.  
 
The regional evaluations complement the Global Assessment by focusing on relevant conclusions 
and recommendations from the Global Assessment, and EC mine action strategy and 
programming issues at the country level. The evaluation will not assess the efficiency, 
effectiveness, and impact of individual projects, except to illustrate changes since the Global 
Assessment or critical programming issues.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
The evaluation covered the period 2002 until today. Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and Yemen were 
selected of which Iraq could only be covered with a desk review because of security constraints. 
The Evaluation Team comprised of Ralf Otto and Steinar Essen of Channel Research. The key 
phases of the study were a desk study in April, a field trip to Yemen in April, a field trip to 
Jordan in May, interviews with EC officials in parallel and a field trip to Lebanon in June. All 
together 64 persons were interviewed either in person, by telephone or questionnaire. 
 
The only significant constraint in this study was the limited availability of some EC officials for 
interviews and the denial of access to some of the documentation despite requests from the 
evaluation team and EC staff supporting this study.   
 
OVERVIEW OF EC FUNDED MINE ACTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
The total amount of funding to Mine Action (MA in the Middle East is more or less the same in 
the two periods that are covered by the two EC global MA strategies (€ 10.37 million in 2002-
2004 and 10.83 million in 2005-2007). The percentage of the total funding to MA rose from 7% 
to 10% in that period. The constancy reflected in these figures is misleading.  
 
The biggest part of the funding during 2002-
04 went to Iraq in 2003 and was related to 
the emergency situation. There was no 
funding for Yemen and Jordan during this 
period. In the following years the funding 
was more diverse but did not include Iraq 
anymore. Funding varies from year to year 
and from country to country.  
                                                     
1
 Regulation (EC) 1724/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning 
action against anti-personnel landmines in developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.1) and Regulation 
(EC) 1725/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action against 
anti-personnel landmines in third countries other than developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.6). The 
provisions are similar and we quote from Regulation (EC) 1724/2001. 
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EC funding to the region was divided into two categories: funding to countries in a crisis (Iraq 
and Lebanon); and funding to countries in a more stable situation (Yemen and Jordan). The 
majority of funding went to humanitarian demining in the crisis countries (70%).  
 
EC MINE ACTION STRATEGY FOR THE MIDDLE EAST 
There is no specific EC strategy for MA for the Middle East and EC Country Strategy Papers 
(CSPs) in general do not include MA. In the case of Iraq no CSP exists. The application of the 
EC global MA strategies (the Regulation) in the four countries is not coherent. By looking at the 
priorities in these strategies and the funding decisions taken, it can be shown that there is no 
stringent logic and that funding decisions cannot always be attributed to strategic objectives. The 
majority of EC officials interviewed declared that they were not aware of the MA strategies or 
confirmed that they did not use it as a reference for funding decisions. Regarding humanitarian 
demining there is no specific strategy. The global MA strategy does refer to humanitarian need 
and the role of MA in humanitarian aid, but the strategy does not explicitly state objectives and 
strategic priorities for humanitarian demining.  
 
REGIONAL APPROACH TO MINE ACTION 
Countries in the Middle East have national mine problems that can be addressed nationally. 
National entities are entrusted with the task. The need to respond to MA problems does not in 
general have regional implications. Present and potential new conflicts between countries in the 
region are a regional aspect. Their relevance for MA lies mainly on the side of prevention and in 
the diplomatic area. A few aspects related to clearance and the Middle East as a region could be 
observed (for example regional budget lines and strategies). These aspects can be seen as 
marginal compared to the fact that the MA problem can and should be addressed nationally.  
 
COORDINATION WITH EUROPEAN UNION-MEMBER STATES 
If at all, coordination between the EC and Member States regarding funding to MA in the Middle 
East takes place at national level in the beneficiary countries (EC delegations, embassies). In the 
four countries no specific coordination mechanism for MA exists between the EC and Member 
States. If coordination takes place it happens within the overall donor coordination process 
(reconstruction, development). Funding in MA is often channelled through the United Nations 
(UN) and coordination is left to the UN and the national stakeholder.  
 
A number of Member States do have focal persons for MA in their governments. There is no 
structure or communication set up for these focal points to communicate with the EC about MA. 
It was stated that there is no need to have a specific coordination mechanism between the EU and 
Member States for MA globally as the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) gives the 
framework, sets the goals and provides for a coordination structure. Nonetheless, in all interviews 
with Member States, representatives stated their wish to have a forum for exchange and 
information. In the past there have been meetings regarding MA between the European Union 
(EU) and Member States but since the thematic budget line no longer exists, these meetings have 
been suspended.  
 
NON-GOVERNMENTAL IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS 
The EC is funding Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) directly only in Lebanon and Iraq. 
These are countries in emergencies where DG ECHO supports NGOs. Other funding for MA in 
the region went entirely to United Nations Development Program (UNDP).  
 
NGOs in the field in general benefit from a person in the NGO Headquarter (HQ) who is aware 
of EC procedures and developments. For NGOs it is easier to link up with DG ECHO than with 
other EC services (to obtain information, to be aware of funding strategies and priorities). This is 
partly because they are used to work with DG ECHO and partly because DG ECHO’s procedures 
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are perceived as clear and straight forward.  
 
NGOs are aware of the increased importance of EC delegations. However, NGOs still have very 
limited knowledge about new EC instruments (and, in particular knowledge of the Stability 
Instrument) or how funding procedures work. The case of Lebanon shows that this could lead to 
difficulties regarding efficiency and appropriate exit strategies.  
 
COUNTRY FINDINGS 
 
Lebanon 
The situation in Lebanon in general and in the MA sector in particular is characterized by 
instability. Although still contaminated with an ‘old’ landmines problem the situation changed 
significantly with the Israeli Lebanese conflict in summer 2006 and the new cluster munitions 
problem. The MA Sector in Lebanon is well established and more complex than in the other 
countries examined in this study. The country is divided into two zones because of the 
peacekeeping operations of the UN in the south, with the Mine Action Coordination Center South 
Lebanon (MACC SL – a project of the UN Mine Action Service – UNMAS) south of the Litani 
River, and the Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC – supported by UNDP) responsible for the 
rest of the country. All humanitarian clearance in South Lebanon is coordinated through MACC 
SL.  
 
Before the crisis in 2006 the EC – as well as other Western donors – did not pay much attention 
to the landmine problem. After 2006, funding to MA rose by more than ten times. EC funding 
after the war in 2006 is characterized by a challenge to avoid gaps in funding MA, first from 
humanitarian budget lines and, later, from European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument 
(ENPI). This was further complicated by changing predictions of the end date for clearance of 
cluster munitions in the south.  
 
Overall the EC funding to Lebanon is relevant. The EC proved to be responsive to the situation 
and to developments in the sector. The fluctuating situation in Lebanon made a flexible approach 
necessary and the EC showed flexibility and responsiveness. Nevertheless the weakness of this 
re-active approach becomes clear today when prolonged funding to the sector and the need for an 
exit strategy require a more strategic, better planned approach.  
 
Regarding efficiency the decision of DG ECHO to fund four international NGOs in 2006 and 
2007 for the clearance of cluster munitions instead of one or two only, is questionable in terms of 
efficiency and integration into longer term planning. Regarding the choice of funding channels 
the EC was mainly following administrative imperatives rather than taking strategic decisions.  
 
The missing strategic vision and planning for an exit becomes relevant when it comes to Linking 
Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD). Although the MA intervention after the 2006 
crisis is, without doubt, relevant and is contributing to reduced suffering, there is no direct link 
between the MA funding and the recovery or reconstruction process in the country. The activities 
for humanitarian demining appear isolated and are not linked to other EC funded programs.  
 
Jordan 
Landmines in Jordan are located in military-controlled border areas in the northern Syrian border 
area, the Jordan Valley and Wadi Araba. They are marked, mapped and partly fenced today. 
Jordan is actively pursuing the resolution of the landmine problem. Jordan signed and ratified the 
APMBC in 1998. The EU is a long-standing partner of Jordan. The EC funded UNDP to support 
Jordan in doing a technical survey, demining and training of deminers.  
 
The EC funding of MA in Jordan is highly relevant. Jordan today has managed to provide its own 
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means and to secure from external sources the funds needed to resolve the landmine problem. So 
far as could be assessed during the field visit, it seems likely the EC funded program that ends in 
2008 will meet all of its objectives.  
 
None of the EC strategy papers for Jordan nor the project document for the project funded via the 
UNDP contain any direct link between MA and the development process. The programme is 
limited to the clearance activities and to the capacity development of the counterpart. The project 
does not foresee any activities directly related to the use of the land, nor does it link to another 
initiative to bridge the gap with potential follow-up development activities.  
 
Yemen 
As a result of several conflicts Yemen is contaminated with both antipersonnel and anti-vehicle 
mines and other Explosive Remnants of War (ERW). Most landmines were laid in pre-unification 
border areas between northern and southern Yemen. The Government of Yemen is committed to 
eliminate the impact of mines and Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) in Yemen. Yemen signed the 
APMBC on December 1997 and has now requested an extension until 2015 for fulfilling its 
APMBC obligations for clearing all known mined areas.  
 
Mine clearance in Yemen is undertaken solely by Yemen Mine Action Centre YEMAC) 
involving staff seconded from the Ministry of Defense. The direct EC support to MA in Yemen is 
limited to the funding of a UNDP programme, which has been running since 1999. The EC 
supports Phase III of the program only.  
 
There has been no EC funding for MA in Yemen prior to 2007 although the situation in Yemen 
was eligible under the EC strategy for MA for 2002-2004. The EC is funding other sectors in 
Yemen and contributes to the reduction of poverty. There is no linkage between this funding and 
the funding to MA.  
 
Iraq 
Iraq is one of the countries most severely affected by landmines and ERW. Since the 2003 
invasion, almost daily attacks with car bombs or other improvised explosive devices indicate that 
huge amounts of Abandoned Explosive Ordnance (AXO) were left unsecured after the overthrow 
of the Hussein regime and subsequently plundered for use in ongoing insurgencies.  
 
The Republic of Iraq acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty in August 2007. The Iraq’s National Mine 
Action Authority (NMAA) was established in 2003 but closed down in 2007 due to corruption, 
political turbulence, changes of management and insecurity (kidnapping). The Kurdish Regional 
Government assumed responsibility for MA in three northern governorates. UNDP has provided 
institutional development and local capacity development support to the NMAA and regional 
MA centers. Demining in Iraq is conducted by international forces and the national military, 
NGOs and commercial demining operators. A number of international NGOs are present in the 
country.  
 
The EC’s support to MA in Iraq is limited to the years 2003 and 2004 (funding decisions in 
2003). The funding to Iraq is characterized by the fact that the EC announced its decision not to 
fund operations in Iraq anymore after 2003. This decision is linked to the security situation and 
the fact that the EC cannot ensure proper monitoring and financial oversight without a presence 
in the country. The decision concerns the MA sector and raises some doubts. The need for 
humanitarian demining increased after 2003. European and non-European donors are funding 
MA program in Iraq whereas the EC, as one of the biggest humanitarian donors in the world, is 
not. The operators that received funding until 2003 are still present in the country and continue to 
work with funds from other donors but are not able to address all needs because of the extent of 
the problem.  
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CONCLUSIONS  
 
1. EC funding to the region is overall relevant. The EU does not follow a regional strategy or 
approach for the Middle East which is appropriate as the few regional aspects of MA in the 
Middle East are outweighed by the national elements (national strategies, national actors). 
Potential regional initiatives to complement national MA programmes are best viewed from a 
diplomatic perspective of conflict prevention and peace building.  
 
2. The global EC strategy does not play an important role in determining funding decisions in the 
Middle East.  The global strategy is more important at Brussels level than at country level. Some 
EC officials perceive strategic planning and decision-making in the MA sector as difficult due to 
the lack of strategic guidance from the Regulation, technical aspects in the MA sector and other 
sector specific aspects.  
 
3. Funding to MA in the Middle East is fragmented. In some cases the funding is not coherent. 
Only some common aspects can be identified in the region (funding to the UN, differentiation 
between countries in crisis and more stable countries).  
 
4. Humanitarian Demining is of importance in the region and is addressed by the EC. However 
there is no specific strategy for humanitarian demining, nor any guidelines or a concept on how to 
integrate humanitarian demining into a reconstruction context.  
 
5. The EC is generally supporting assessments of the MA problem in the region, in particular by 
funding Landmine Impact Surveys (LIS). In some contexts the baseline data, methodology and 
quality of assessments is not sufficient in terms of comprehensiveness and reliability.  
 
6. The funding emphasis is on clearance which is appropriate overall. In three of the four 
countries a landmine/UXO free country is a realistic option and can be achieved in the near 
future. 
 
7. For the most part, EC funding to MA is not explicitly integrated into wider national 
reconstruction or development strategies. Linkages are limited in the sense that MA programmes 
take place in the wider reconstruction and development context but there is no joint planning for 
broader results or specific emphasis or measures on linkages between programmes. 
 
8. Operationalising the concept of LRRD is still a challenge. Whereas DG ECHO procedures are 
flexible and comparably fast, procedures of other instruments are less flexible and slow.  
 
9. The Middle East is not a priority region for MA within the EC. Before and after the 
cancellation of the thematic budget line, EC officials did not pay much attention to MA in the 
region (with the exception of humanitarian demining). By choosing the UN (and in particular 
UNDP) for the support to national structures, the EC follows a low profile approach in the region.  
 
10. Funding of the EC and of Member States is overall coherent when it comes to selecting target 
countries, objectives and approaches. The most significant divergence is the case of Iraq, where 
EU Member States fund humanitarian demining but the EC does not.  
 
11. Coherence in funding to MA in the region is achieved despite the lack of coordination 
mechanisms in the countries, the region, or at European capital level. The APMBC and 
instruments provide the overall coordination framework for donors, including the EC and 
Member States.  
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12. Direct funding to NGOs is, in general, provided only for humanitarian demining. The 
procedure and management follows DG ECHO standard procedures, which is not always 
appropriate as MA operations have some specifications different from other sectors.  
 
13. The EC and other donors face difficulties in responding to the challenge of cluster munitions. 
Weak assessments and difficulties in determining realistic end dates for clearance are a 
programming challenge for donors. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1. The EC should continue to work with national approaches in the Middle East and does not 
need to think about an explicit regional strategy for MA.  
 
2. The EC should consider more specific guidance to those within the EC who are dealing with 
planning and MA strategies at the national level. To achieve better guidance in MA for the EC 
delegations, the EC should consider a focal point at Brussels level or in the region.  
 
3. In countries with a stable environment, the EC should follow the global strategy in a more 
coherent way. If the EC decides to support a country’s effort in fulfilling the APMBC obligations 
this should be done coherently and based on a strategic approach.  
 
4. In countries with an ongoing or recent crisis the EC should continue to fund MA quickly and 
flexibly regardless the countries’ commitment to the APMBC.  
 
5. The EC should put a higher emphasis on the challenge of LRRD related to demining. The EC 
(and, in particular, DG ECHO) should consider a specific sectoral strategy for humanitarian 
demining and related guidelines. To achieve these aspects DG ECHO should consider a focal 
point for MA in Brussels.  
 
6. The EC should continue to fund assessments in MA. This could be LIS as has been funded in 
the past but also socio economic impact studies for mine and cluster ammunition affected areas.   
 
7. In the four countries assessed, the EC should continue (or, in the case of Iraq, start) to focus 
funding of clearance activities. The EC should continue to fund MA in the region until all 
countries have fulfilled their treaty obligations. Where the EC is funding programmes which do 
not only have a focus on fast clearance of contaminated sites, the EC should increase efforts in 
linking MA to reconstruction and development goals.  
 
8. If the EC is funding MA in the region, it should be strategically and properly followed-up. To 
facilitate strategic planning and oversight, the EC should consider a focal point in Brussels or in 
the region.  
 
9. The EC should reconsider its decision not to fund MA in Iraq.  
 
10. The EC should consider increased information exchange and coordination with EU Member 
States without creating any mechanisms that would overlap with coordination under the APMBC. 
To facilitate information exchange between the EC and Member States the EC should consider a 
focal point at Brussels level.  
 
11. The EC should learn from the response to the cluster munitions problem in South Lebanon 
and ensure that, in future contexts, the lessons learnt are applied. This could be done by 
developing specific guidelines for cluster munitions problems or by developing compilations of 
good practice cases.  
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12. The EC should apply a coherent approach when it comes to requirements for oversight and 
programme ownership. In particular in Iraq the EC should reconsider the decision not to fund 
MA (or other humanitarian activities) because of the impossibility of monitoring and controlling.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
BACKGROUND 
 
In 2001 the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament adopted two Regulations on the 
reinforcement of the EU response against Antipersonnel Landmines (APL).2 These (referred to 
collectively as “the Regulation”) laid the foundation of the European integrated and focused 
policy. Article 13, paragraph 1 of the EC Regulation states that:  
 
“The Commission shall regularly assess operations financed by the Community in order 
to establish whether the objectives of the operations have been achieved and to provide 
guidelines for improving the effectiveness of future operations.” 
 
The APL Regulation goes on to state:  
 
“Every three years after entry into force of this Regulation, the Commission shall submit 
to the European Parliament an overall assessment of all Community mine actions (…).”3 
 
The EC Mine Action Strategy and Multi-annual Indicative Programme, 2005-20074 further 
specifies that “more specific, geographic, evaluations of EC-funded mine actions, analysing the 
results and their impact” will be undertaken to complement the overall assessment. 
 
To implement these provisions, the EC: 
 
1. Commissioned a global assessment of EC mine policy and actions over the period 2002-
2004; 
2. Entered into an agreement with The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining (GICHD) to, inter alia, manage the programme of regional evaluations to 
identify lessons learned within EC-funded mine action projects in the following regions: 
 
 Africa  Caucasus-Central Asia  Latin America 
 Asia-Pacific  Europe  Middle East 
 
The general objective of the Global Assessment was to determine to what extent the objectives 
and means set in the APL Regulation had been complied with and used in terms of strategy, 
programming, commitments and implementation. The Report from the Global Assessment was 
issued in March 2005,5 while the agreement with the GICHD was concluded in December that 
year. In April 2008 GICHD contracted Channel Research to undertake the regional evaluation for 
the Middle East. 
 
The regional evaluations complement the Global Assessment by focusing on  
                                                     
2
 Regulation (EC) 1724/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning 
action against anti-personnel landmines in developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.1) and Regulation 
(EC) 1725/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action against 
anti-personnel landmines in third countries other than developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.6). The 
provisions are similar and we quote from Regulation (EC) 1724/2001. 
3
 Article 14 
4
 This is the second strategy and multi-year indicative programme since the adoption of the EC Regulation: 
the first covered the period 2002-04.  
5
 Gasser, Russell and Robert Keeley, Global Assessment of EC Mine Policy and Actions: 2002-2004. 
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(i) relevant conclusions and recommendations from the Global Assessment, and  
(ii) EC mine action strategy and programming issues at the country level.  
 
Thus, the evaluation will not assess the efficiency, effectiveness, and impact of individual 
projects, except to illustrate changes since the Global Assessment or critical programming issues.  
 
Overall objective of the evaluation:  
 
To provide systematic and objective assessments of EC-funded mine action in the Middle East to 
generate credible and useful lessons for decision-makers within the EC, allowing them to 
improve the planning and management of existing and future mine action projects, programmes, 
and policies. 
 
Specific objectives of the evaluation:  
 
• To assess the relevance of EC-funded mine activities vis-à-vis: 
 the geographic and thematic priorities defined in the Strategies for 2002-2004 and 
2005-2007; 
 national and regional needs, strategies, and priorities; 
 EC Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programmes for mine-affected 
countries in the Middle East 2002-2007; 
 EC strategy documents for the Middle East  
• To analyze the allocation of EC funds among mine-affected states in the Middle East, and 
across the various components of mine action (survey, clearance, MRE, etc.);6 
• To assess the effectiveness of EC-funded mine action support in: 
 addressing the landmine & UXO problems in mine-affected partner countries 
 fostering national ownership and the development of local capacities; 
 supporting the overall development and rehabilitation priorities/ programmes of the 
beneficiary countries;  
 supporting local mine action organisations; 
• To assess the coordination among the EC and other agencies supporting mine action in a 
country (regional; national; UN; donors; international NGOs; etc.); 
• To assess the impact of deconcentration on the planning and delivery of EC support to 
mine action in the Middle East, including the capacity of EC delegations to assess proposals 
for mine action projects and to monitor/evaluate the implementation of these projects; 
• To asses the adequacy of the EC national strategies and plans, and the effectiveness of 
implementation; 
• To assess the existence of an ‘exit strategy’ for the country to graduate from donor 
assistance (including plans for sustainability); 
• To assess the linkages between mine action and other issues, such as humanitarian 
assistance, development, and armed violence reduction 
• To assess the impact of the end of the specific budget line for anti-personnel landmines and 
the introduction of the new “stability instrument” on future mine action support from the 
EC to the Middle East; 
• To make recommendations to improve the identification, design, and implementation of 
EC-funded mine projects; 
                                                     
6
 This question addresses, among other issues, the fact that “Commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty” is one of 
the criteria listed in the EC Mine Action Strategy 2005-2007 for determining geographic allocations.  
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• To generate recommendations to enhance the opportunities for cross-fertilization among 
mine action programs in the Middle East and globally. 
 
TERMS OF REFERENCE 
 
The full Terms of Reference (TORs) are attached as Appendix 1. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The evaluation covered the period 2002 until today. Four countries in the region7 were selected of 
which one could only be covered with a desk review because of security constraints: Iraq, 
Lebanon, Jordan and Yemen.  
 
The evaluation was implemented in three phases: 
 
• Planning, desk research and data collection in Brussels 
• Country missions to Yemen, Jordan, and Lebanon and in parallel interviews with EC 
services, EU Member States, NGO HQ  
• Analysis and reporting 
 
The Evaluation Team comprised Ralf Otto and Steinar Essen of Channel Research. The key 
phases of the study were organized as follows: 
 
Country Timing Team Members 
Yemen 12 to 16 April Steinar Essen 
Jordan 3 to 8 May Steinar Essen 
Interviews in Brussels Mid April to end May Ralf Otto 
Lebanon 22 to 28 June8 Ralf Otto and Steinar Essen 
 
As the evaluation did not focus on the performance of individual projects, Evaluation Team 
members spent most or all of their time in capitals and major centers for meetings and to collect 
documents and data from: 
 
• EC delegations 
• national authorities and officials from national mine action centers 
• UN agencies supporting mine action 
• representatives from other major donors to mine action in that country 
• representatives from mine action operators (local and international) 
• other key government officials  
 
Selected field visits were undertaken to the Nabatye area in South Lebanon, visiting FSD (Cluster 
Bomb Unit (CBU) 276 and CBU 388) and MAG (CBU 390/391 and CBU 273) and Jordan, 
visiting Royal Engineer Corps (REC) on the North Shunha Project (Jordan Valley).9  
                                                     
7
 „Middle East“ is not defined as a region in the European Commission. Sometimes the term Near East is 
used as well. Syria and Iran were not included in the ToR for this assignment.  
8
 The field visit to Lebanon was originally planned for May but had to be postponed because of security 
concerns and the temporary blockade of the airport in Beirut.  
9
 Due to the security situation at the time of the field visit to Yemen it was not possible to visit project sites.  
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Additional information was obtained from: 
  
• Review of project documents (project proposals and contracts; mid-term and final reports, 
as well as final evaluations, monitoring reports, etc., where available); 
• Interviews with relevant EC officials at Relex, Aidco, and DG ECHO (in Brussels);  
• Questionnaire survey with 20 questions and a ranking from (unimportant issue (1) to 
extremely important issue (6); (the questionnaire survey was undertaken by GICHD) 
• Follow-up telephone interviews with project managers/implementers/recipients of EC 
funds and projects, managers of operator organisations, both in organisations’ headquarters 
and on the field, and beneficiary countries’ officials, etc.). 
• EC CSP and National Indicative Programs (NIP). 
• National Development Plans, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, and National Mine 
Action Strategies from the four focus countries 
• Relevant documentation from the UN  
• Recent mine action evaluations commissioned by other agencies 
• The Internet 
• Other sources, as appropriate. 
 
The evaluation team used the standard Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) evaluation criteria and where 
appropriate the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian 
Action (ALNAP) evaluation criteria for assessing humanitarian aid programs.10,11 An open 
interview questionnaire was designed based on the evaluation criteria and further defined with 
more detailed questions, which were adapted and updated throughout the evaluation process. This 
questionnaire was also sent out by email either to be answered by an interlocutor or to form the 
basis of an interview in person or by telephone.12 All together 64 persons were interviewed either 
in person or by telephone.13 
LIMITATIONS 
 
The only significant constraint in this study was the limited availability of some EC officials for 
interviews and the denial of access to some of the documentation.  Whereas overall there was 
interest in the study and generous support by those involved, the evaluators did not always get 
access to documentation requested. In particular project documentation to the NGO funding in 
Lebanon and Iraq could not be reviewed so that information from interviews and site visits 
(possible in Lebanon only) could not be cross-checked. Requests from the evaluation team and 
EC staff supporting this study remained unanswered.  
                                                     
10
 http://www.oecd.org/document/22/0,3343,en_2649_34435_2086550_1_1_1_1,00.html  
11
 http://www.alnap.org/publications/eha_dac/index.htm  
12
 The questionnaire is attached in appendix.  
13
 A full list of persons interviewed is attached in appendix.  
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2. GENERAL FINDINGS 
OVERVIEW OF EC FUNDED MINE ACTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
The total amount of funding to MA in the Middle East is more or less the same in the two periods 
that are covered by the two EC global MA strategies. The percentage of the total funding to MA 
rose from 7% to 10% from the old strategy to the more recent one as is shown in the following 
table: 
Table 1 – Mine Action funding to the Middle East  
Period Total EC mine action 
funding (Euro) 
EC mine action funding 
for  Middle East (Euro) 
% for Middle East 
2002-2004 145.2 million 10,374,260 7% 
2005-2007 107.8 million 10,831,684 10% 
 
The constancy reflected in these figures is misleading, which is revealed by looking at the 
individual countries and years in detail. It shows that the biggest part of the funding during the 
2002 to 2004 period goes to Iraq in 2003 and is related to the emergency situation. There is no 
funding to Yemen and Jordan during this period. In the following years the funding is more 
diverse but does not include Iraq any more. 
Table 2 – Funding per country & year14  
EU funding in 
mine action 
Iraq No of 
projects 
Yemen No of 
projects 
Jordan No of 
projects 
Lebanon No of 
projects 
Total 
funding 
in 2002 - - - - - - - - - 
in 2003 9,870,000 8 - - - - 504,260 1 10,374,260 
in 2004 - - - - - - - - - 
in 2005 - - - - 800,000 1 - - 800,000 
in 2006 - - - - - - 3,834,493 4 3,834,493 
in 2007 - - 2,000,000 1     3,066,749 4 5,066,749 
in 2008 - - - - 4,500,000 1 3,930,442 5 8,430,442 
Total     2002-
2007 
9,870,000 8 2,000,000 1 5,300,000 2 11,335,944 14 28,505,944 
Total in percent 34.62%   7.02%   18,59%   39.77%   100% 
Related to 
humanitarian 
crisis 
9,870,000 
 
8 - - - - 10,831,684 
 
13 20,701,684 
 
Percentage 100% 100% - - - - 95% 92% 72% 
 
EC funding to MA in the Middle East varies from year to year and from country to country. It is 
divided into two categories, funding in countries with a crisis (Iraq and Lebanon) and the two 
other countries. The majority of funding goes to humanitarian demining in the crisis countries 
(70%).  
 
Only in Lebanon and Iraq the EC is funding NGOs directly. The background is the fact that Iraq 
                                                     
14
 Additionally to the programs in the table one global advocacy program with a focus on the Middle East 
was funded by the EC in 2003: “Engaging non-state armed groups in a landmine ban” for Colombia and 
Middle East, implementing organisation: Geneva Call, amount 500.000, duration 36 months 
(http://www.genevacall.org/home.htm)  
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and Lebanon are countries with emergency situations where DG ECHO supports NGOs.15 Other 
funding for MA in the region went entirely to UNDP, which is primarily funding state structures 
but can also become involved in capacity building with NGOs (local). 
 
  Table 3 – Number of projects per partner & country 
 No of projects No of countries 
UNDP 5 4 (Yemen, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq) 
MAG 5 2 (Lebanon, Iraq) 
FSD 2 1 (Lebanon) 
HI-F 4 2 (Lebanon, Iraq) 
DCA 3 2 (Lebanon, Iraq) 
DDG 2 1(Iraq) 
Intersos 1 1 (Iraq) 
NPA 1 1 (Iraq) 
Total 22 4 
EC MINE ACTION STRATEGY FOR THE MIDDLE EAST 
There is no specific EC strategy for MA for the Middle East. EC CSPs for the individual 
countries exist except for Iraq. Only in one country MA is mentioned in the CSP but, as will be 
shown in the section about Lebanon, the decision to fund demining was taken first (following 
humanitarian demining) and then MA was integrated into the CSP. 
 Table 4 – Is Mine Action mentioned in the EC Country Strategy Paper? 
Mine Action mentioned in EC 
Country Strategy Paper 
Yes/no Documents 
Iraq n.a. No CSP 
Yemen No CSP 2002-2006, CSP 2007-2013, NIP 2005-
2006, NIP 2007-2010 
Jordan No CSP 2008-2013, NIP 2005-2006, EC annual 
reports and ENP report 2002, 2003, 2004 
Yes CSP 2007-2013 & NIP 2007-2010 Lebanon 
No CSP 2002-2006 & NIP 2002-2004 
NIP 2005-2006 
 
The country strategies cannot be seen as the strategic framework for funding to MA in the Middle 
East. Consequently the only references regarding a strategy are the two EC global MA strategies 
(2002-2004 and 2005-2007). The application of these strategies in the four countries is not 
coherent. By looking at the priorities in these strategies and the funding decisions taken, it can be 
shown that there is no stringent logic and that funding decisions cannot always be attributed to 
strategic objectives (see appendix 4 for an overview).  
 
This observation goes in line with the fact that the majority of EC officials interviewed during 
this study declared that they were either not aware of the MA strategies or confirmed that they 
did not use it as a reference for funding decisions.  
 
This observation goes in line with the fact that a significant part of the funding in the region went 
to humanitarian demining which is funded by DG ECHO. Within DG ECHO there is no specific 
                                                     
15
 DG ECHO is strongly engaged in the Middle East. Funding is allocated to the West Bank and Gaza strip 
and to Palestinian refugees living in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. DG ECHO is also supporting Iraqi refugees 
in the region – mostly to Syria and Jordan - and internally displaced within Iraq. 
http://ec.europa.eu/delegations/deljor/en/eu_and_jordan/ECHO.htm  
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strategy for humanitarian demining. The global MA strategy does refer to the humanitarian need 
and the role of MA in humanitarian aid. However the strategy does not explicitly state objectives 
and strategic priorities for humanitarian demining. There is no linkage in the strategy to DG 
ECHO’s mandate or overall strategy.   
 
During the period 2000 to 2006 the majority of the EC funded programs under the MA Budget 
Line were still managed from Brussels (four out of six).16 The shift to the delegations took place 
afterwards and today the majority of the funded MA programs are managed in the region (in 
particular in Lebanon). Overall efficiency of the decentralization process was perceived as 
positive.  
REGIONAL APPROACH TO MINE ACTION 
 
As stated above – and similar to findings from other regional EC MA evaluations – the EC does 
not have a regional strategy or a regional approach to MA in the Middle East. As will be shown 
in the country sections later, the countries have mine problems which can be addressed 
nationally. National entities are entrusted with the task. They are usually closely linked to the 
countries’ military.  
 
Figure 1 – Funding allocation per country 
 
 
The reasons for the existence of mines have in some cases regional implications (e.g. conflicts 
with neighbours). The need to respond to the problems does in general not have regional 
implications.17 However some aspects related to MA and the Middle East as a region could be 
observed:   
 
• Regional budget lines exist (such as MEDA in the past) 
• EC Regional Strategies within ENPI today18 and regional cooperation 
• EC partly operates with a regional structure (e.g. Yemen was managed for a certain time 
from Amman, the Jordan delegation includes a section for Iraq and a regional office for 
ECHO, EC staff members have been shifted from Amman to Lebanon and EC staff 
members travel to Amman regularly) 
• Jordan declared its intention to become regional actor in mine action 
                                                     
16
 Only Yemen and Jordan were managed from delegations.  
17
 This study does not look at the root causes of the mine problematic or at any preventive or advocacy 
measures taken or not taken by the EC. Although very interesting and important, these issues are beyond 
the scope of this evaluation.  
18
 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_euromed_rsp_en.pdf; does not incl. MA 
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These aspects can be seen as marginal compared to the fact that the MA problem can and should 
be addressed nationally.  
COORDINATION WITH EU MEMBER STATES 
 
EU Members States fund MA programmes in the Middle East. If at all the coordination between 
the EC and Member States regarding funding for MA in the Middle East takes place at national 
level in the beneficiary countries (EC delegations, embassies).19 In the four countries no specific 
coordination mechanism for MA exists between the EC and Member States. If coordination takes 
place it happens within the overall donor coordination process (reconstruction, development). 
MA specific coordination was perceived by interlocutors as weak.20 Funding is often channelled 
through the UN and coordination is left to the UN and the national stakeholder.  
 
At capital level Member States are consulted when it comes to development planning and the 
drafting of CSP. This does not include MA or the involvement of MA expertise. There is no MA 
specific coordination mechanism or procedure foreseen at capital level. 
 
A number of Member States do have focal persons for MA in their governments (e.g. Denmark 
and Germany). There is no structure or communication set up for these focal points to 
communicate with the EC about MA. The focal points in Member States in Europe are not 
involved in a coordination process when it comes to EC funding to MA in the Middle East and 
there is generally not much awareness of EC funding to MA among Member States. EC funding 
is seen as not very ‘visible’ and funding sources are difficult to identify, which makes it difficult 
to follow for Member States.21  
 
During interviews it was stated that there is no need to have a specific coordination mechanism 
between the EU and Member States for MA globally. The APMBC gives the framework, sets the 
goals and provides for a coordination structure. The UN is seen as the second coordinating body 
for MA. Coordination in the MA sector is by some perceived as easy to achieve as there are few 
actors. The country cases within this study however show that the level of coordination was 
rather poor.  
 
The wish to have a forum for exchange and information was expressed in all interviews with 
Member States. Until 2006 there have been meetings regarding MA between the EU and Member 
States but since the thematic budget line does no longer exist these meetings have been 
suspended.  
NON-GOVERNMENTAL IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS 
In two of the four countries the EC funded international NGO partners directly (Lebanon and 
Iraq). In Yemen, international NGOs are not active in clearance, but are in Mine Victim 
                                                     
19
 According to the questionnaire to EC delegations donor coordination mechanisms exist and are useful (in 
three countries assessed, excluding Iraq). In all three countries the existence and utility of donor 
coordination mechanisms were ranked as important (4 on a scale of 6).  
20
 In the questionnaire the EC rated the importance of coordination between the EC and EU Member States 
vis-à-vis MA with 5 (out of 6). In the other countries the importance of MA specific coordination for MA was 
rated with 3 only. 
21
 This statement excludes DG ECHO funding to MA as DG ECHO follows a quite rigid visibility strategy. As 
described earlier non-DG ECHO funding in the region goes to UNDP, thus only becomes ‘visible’ to other 
donors if this funding comes to the knowledge of other donors.  
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Assistance (MVA) whereas in Jordan international NGOs are active but not with EC funding.22  
 
EC support to MA is not very visible in the Middle East and EC funding sources are difficult to 
identify. DG ECHO is perceived as flexible and predictable for implementing partners. This is 
less the case for other EC services. There is no focal point for NGOs regarding MA within the 
EC. 
 
NGOs in the field in general benefit from a person in the NGO HQ who is aware of EC 
procedures and developments. NGOs with “EC experts” have a better knowledge of EC funding 
procedures and decision making process. For these focal points it is easier to link up with DG 
ECHO than with other EC services (to obtain information, to be aware of funding strategies and 
priorities). This is partly because they are used to work with DG ECHO and partly because DG 
ECHO’s procedures are perceived as clear and straight forward.  
 
The reform process within the EC (and in particular decentralisation) is widely known to 
implementing partners. However there is still very limited knowledge about new instruments 
among NGOs (in particular knowledge of the Stability Instrument) and how funding procedures 
work. NGOs are in any case aware of the increased importance of EC delegations.  
 
The case of Lebanon showed consequences of this lack of knowledge of EC procedures. NGO 
partners in the South were not aware of the potential funding gap that might occur at the end of 
2008, in case the activities need to continue into 2009 (which is likely).23 NGO partners who 
started working with DG ECHO funds have expectations regarding flexibility and speed of 
decision taking based on ECHO procedures. The fact that other EC instruments are less flexible 
and require longer decision making procedures, was not commonly known. NGOs working with 
EC funds run a risk if they do not either discuss early on about duration of funding with the EC or 
look out for funding alternatives (e.g. from Member States).24 The EC delegation on the other 
hand did not have the knowledge of NGO partners and their way of working (e.g. dependence on 
the EC as one donor) to raise the issue early enough.  
                                                     
22
 Although no EC funding goes to NGOs in Jordan the questionnaire filled in by the EC ranks the 
importance of the “Role & Performance of international MA NGOs receiving EC funding” with 5. 
23
 For details please see the following section on Lebanon.  
24
 National coordinating mechanisms (be it under the UN or be it within national structures) cannot 
compensate for this as these institutions also do not have the specific background regarding EC procedures 
and are therefore not in a position to foresee potential endings or gaps in EC funding.  
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3. COUNTRY FINDINGS 
LEBANON 
CONTEXT 
The situation in Lebanon in general and in the MA sector as well is characterized by instability. 
Although still contaminated with an ‘old’ landmines problem the situation changed significantly 
with the Israeli Lebanese conflict in summer 2006 and the new cluster munitions problem. The 
international response to the MA problem can be divided into periods prior to the 2006 war and 
after.   
 
From the beginning of the civil war in 1975 until the end of the Israeli occupation in 2000 mines 
and explosive ordnance were used extensively. In 2000 when Israel withdrew from South 
Lebanon it left behind some 400,000 landmines. The 2003 LIS found 306 mine-impacted 
communities affected by 933 mine and UXO contaminated sites over an estimated 137 square 
kilometres of contaminated land.25 
 
Prior to the conflict in July-August 2006, two 
areas of South Lebanon were contaminated 
with landmines and ERW: the area north of the 
Litani River (so called area 6) and the Blue 
Line bordering Israel. United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) committed to clear remaining landmines 
and booby-traps in Area 6. This will leave 
South Lebanon mine-free, except for mines laid 
along or adjacent to the Blue Line. 
 
During the war between Israel and Hezbollah 
from 12 July to 14 August 2006 about four 
million cluster sub-munitions were fired on 
Lebanon, of which an estimated one million did 
not detonate.26  
 
Despite numerous calls by the international community for information regarding the firing data, 
Israel had not provided detailed strike information on the type, quantity and location of cluster 
bombs dropped.27 The UN estimates that, in addition to cluster munitions, approximately 15,300 
other items of UXO fell on the ground in South Lebanon. Accusations from Lebanon that Israel 
had laid out mines during the 2006 conflict have been disputed.28  
 
At the end of May 2007 fighting erupted between Fatah al-Islam and the Lebanese army in the 
Palestinian Nahr al-Bared refugee camp in northern Lebanon. Fatah al-Islam is reported to have 
booby-trapped buildings throughout the camp, in addition to laying unspecified mines and 
roadside bombs.29 
                                                     
25
 http://www.icbl.org/lm/2007/lebanon.html 
26
 Israel has admitted to firing only 1.2 million submunitions. http://www.icbl.org/lm/2007/lebanon.html 
27
 Some media sources reported that maps were exchanged at the occasion of the exchange of two dead 
soldiers against prisoners in July 2008.  
28
 http://www.icbl.org/lm/2007/lebanon.html 
29
 “Lebanese Army Pounds Fighters at Refugee Camp,” Washington Post, 3 June 2007; “In fight against 
militants, Lebanon bolstered by US, Gulf countries,” Christian Science Monitor, 4 June 2007. 
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About 26 percent of the affected area in Lebanon is agricultural land.30 A recent study undertaken 
by Landmine Action calculates the total costs due to cluster munitions contamination with US$ 
233,2 million (costs of lost agricultural production, cost of clearance and risk reduction activities, 
cost of death and injuries).31 Only the international funding to establish and run the initial cluster 
munitions response program in 2006 and 2007 is estimated at US$ 80 million.32 This significant 
contribution from the government and international actors alone could not prevent serious losses 
in South Lebanon which is borne mainly by individuals and their families.33 
 
Regarding casualties it is difficult to obtain comprehensive data for Lebanon which can best be 
shown by a quote from Landmine Monitor:  
 
“Landmine Monitor has been unable to obtain reliable statistics on the number of 
mine/ERW/IED casualties in 2006-2007 from stakeholders in Lebanon, due to the crisis 
situation after the conflict; other factors appear to be lack of cooperation between 
stakeholders, lack of verification and difficulties in providing casualty data by calendar 
year.”34 
 
The Lebanon Mine Action Centre (LMAC) gives figures, which state a total of 4.292 mine 
victims since 1975 (1.876 killed, 2.416 injured). Casualties since 2006 are counted as 317 total 
(41 killed and 276 injured).35 
 
Figure 2 – Mine victims in Lebanon; 2000-08   
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Besides numerous technical surveys and smaller studies, a number of comprehensive studies have 
been undertaken to review the problem and the set up to address it. The LIS conducted in 2002-
2003 by MAG was certified by UNMAS in 2004 and released in 2005.36 A review of the NDO 
                                                     
30
 MACC SL presentation to Handicap International, Tyre, 19 March 2007 and Damage and Early Recovery 
Needs Assessment of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Food and Agriculture Organisation, November 
2006 
31
 Counting the Cost, The economic impact of cluster munitions contamination in Lebanon, by Greg 
Crowther, Landmine Action, May 2008, page 3 
32
 Counting the Cost, Page 5 
33
 “(…), this expenditure on cluster munitions clearance has not prevented direct economic impacts on the 
population of southern Lebanon. This analysis suggest that between US$ 33 million and US$ 122 million in 
economic losses will have been borne in this area as direct result of cluster munitions use.”  Page 6 
34
 http://www.icbl.org/lm/2007/lebanon.html  
35
 Source: Presentation of Bgd. Gen. Mohamad Fehmi, slide 28 
36
 With funding contribution from the EC.  
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MA program was undertaken by the GICHD in 2006. A comprehensive review of United Nations 
Mine Action Service (UNMAS) activities in Lebanon found that the overall response was rapid 
and effective, despite the lack of early contingency planning, and that the UN rapid response 
framework was capable to address large, high-profile emergencies. Coordination was identified 
as an area for improvement and increased focus on MRE was suggested.37 
THE MINE ACTION PROGRAMME 
The MA Sector in Lebanon is well established and more complex than in the other countries 
regarded for this study. The Republic of Lebanon has not acceded to the APMBC. Its long-held 
position has been that it is unable to join the treaty due to the continuing conflict with Israel.38 
The country is divided into two zones because of the peacekeeping operations of the UN in the 
south. Key actors are: 
 
• North of the Litani river: 
o The Lebanese National Mine Action Authority (LNMAA, the inter-ministerial body 
responsible for mine action policy) 
o Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC) (former National Demining Office-NDO) 
o UN Development Programme (UNDP) 
o Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) 
• South of the Litani river 
o Mine Action Coordination Center South Lebanon (MACC SL) 
o UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS)39 parting support of the UN Force in Lebanon 
(UNIFIL) 
o Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) 
 
LMAC, a part of the LAF, has the overall responsibility for implementing the MA policy and 
strategy (mine free country by 2012), coordination, management and implementation of all MA 
in Lebanon. 
 
MACC SL provides needs assessments, planning, coordination and quality-assurance support to 
MA operations in South Lebanon (below the Litani river), including UNIFIL’s area of operations. 
In the south, MACC SL conducts accreditation on behalf of LMAC. MACC SL is a tripartite 
structure comprising the UN, LAF and UAE  representation. In May 2007 the LMAC requested 
MACC SL to maintain its liaison function between UNIFIL and the LAF, to maintain its current 
structure and to provide technical, operational and strategic advice to the LAF Engineering 
Regiment and LMAC throughout 2008. UNMAS agreed that MACC SL would remain until the 
end of 2008. 
All humanitarian clearance in South Lebanon is coordinated through MACC SL. UNIFIL’s 
existing demining unit became involved in humanitarian clearance after mid-2006, and several 
countries sent troops to support humanitarian clearance. They went through the same 
                                                     
37
 Evaluation findings in UNMAS, “Annual Report 2006,” New York, p. 47. 
38
 http://www.icbl.org/lm/2007/lebanon.html  
39
 UNMAS manages the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF). In 2006 37.1% of the 
VTF were earmarked by donors for Lebanon. In 2006, 27 donors contributed a total of US$51,029,053 to 
the VTF. The EC’s contribution was US$6,433,962. (UNMAS Brochure) 
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accreditation process as the other operators.40 Up to 47 demining and battle area clearance teams 
from seven countries were accredited by MACC SL.41 
UNDP has supported the institutional development of the NDO (now LMAC), especially its 
management capacity, through a chief technical advisor and a national MA program officer since 
2003. In the period 2003 to 2006 UNDP worked with funding from DFID, Denmark and from its 
own HQ schemes.42 From January to December 2007 UNDP was funded again from HQ schemes 
and also from Sweden. 
 
MRE in Lebanon is conducted by national and international NGOs, which considerably increased 
their coverage in response to the 2006 war and the May Nahr al-Bared crisis in 2007. Local 
NGOs with a network of 318 MRE activists, the World Rehabilitation Fund (WRF) and mine 
clearance organisations provided MRE and community liaison, coordinated by LMAC. 
International NGOs newly involved in MRE in Lebanon after the 2006 war were DanChurchAid, 
Handicap International and INTERSOS.43 The Lebanon Mine Resource Centre (LMRC) at the 
Faculty of Health Sciences of the University of Balamand provided training support. Norwegian 
Peoples Aid (NPA), WRF and UNICEF continued to provide technical and financial support to 
Mine Risk Education (MRE) in Lebanon. 
 
The civil society and non-governmental disability sector is strong and provides services the 
government is unable to provide: however, it relies heavily on international donor support. 
EC SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION 
The EC support as well as the support of most other international donors can be divided into pre 
2006 and post 2006.44 After 2006 the funding to MA rose to amounts more than ten times higher 
than before the war.45  
 
EC funding prior to the 2006 crisis 
 
The pre 2006 war period was covered by the CSP 2002-2006.46 The EC’s strategy was related to 
the Barcelona process and mainly funded by the MEDA programme.47 Priority sectors were:  
• support for economic reforms 
• the promotion of social development and equilibrium to reduce income disparities and 
alleviate poverty, and  
• reduction of environmental degradation  
                                                     
40
 According to MACC SL there are a total of 929 persons involved in EOD/BAC of which 872 are national 
staff and 57 are international staff.  
41
 Several NGOs were involved in EOD and BAC in South Lebanon: Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), Handicap International (HI), the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) 
and DanChurchAid. The Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA) conducted humanitarian clearance as 
well as commercial companies including BACTEC, ArmorGroup and RONCO. 
42
 UNDP through its Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) allocates its resources through a 
scheme called “Target for Resource Assignments from the Core” (TRAC). The TRAC scheme earmarks 
55% of UNDP core resources for country programmes and projects. 
43
 INTERSOS did not receive EC funding.  
44
 An exception regarding international engagement are UAE which supported demining in Lebanon at a 
high level over the last years-including before 2006.  
45
 Landmine Monitor identified donations of $68,845,934 (€54,800,553) for emergency and other mine 
action, reported by 20 countries and the EC, compared to $6,300,000 provided by six countries and other 
funding channels in 2005. 
46
 While the CSP refers to demining and is quite detailed on the reconstruction and development strategy, 
there is no link between the two. NIP 2005-2006 confirms the adequacy of the CSP, but does not refer to 
demining at all. 
47
 http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/index_en.htm  
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• development of human resources; and  
• the promotion of human and individual rights and cohesion between Lebanon's numerous 
sectarian and religious groups. 
 
The total amount of funds committed under MEDA I (1995-1999) for bilateral assistance was € 
182 million, while under MEDA II (2000-2006) the total amount allocated was € 235 million. 
 
Additionally ECHO made a significant contribution. In 2000 for example ECHO provided a grant 
of 4.2 million for 12 NGO actions in health, physiological support for former prisoners, farming, 
basic household support, schooling for children, handicap support (Palestinian refugee camps), 
and humanitarian demining to alleviate the humanitarian consequences after the Israeli 
withdrawal.  
 
Activities related to demining were financed from non-MEDA and non-ECHO budget lines. A 
Level One Mine Impact Survey and a humanitarian demining program were financed from the 
rehabilitation budget line.48 Two grant contracts were signed with Mines Advisory Group in the 
UK (MAG-UK) under the Rehabilitation Budget Line 2002-2004. 
 
EC funding after the 2006 crisis 
 
EC funding after the war in 2006 is characterized by the challenge to avoid gaps in funding MA 
first, from humanitarian budget lines and, later, from ENPI funds. This was further complicated 
by changing predictions for an end date for cluster munitions clearance in the south.  
 
International funding for MA in Lebanon rose steeply in 2006 in response to the mine/UXO 
contamination resulting from the war. A UN Flash Appeal and the international donor Stockholm 
Conference for Lebanon’s Early Recovery in August 2006, in addition to bilateral funding 
agreements, raised funds to respond to the crisis. 
 
After the end of hostilities, the EC contributed to Lebanon € 107 million for the year 2006 at the 
Stockholm conference. The EC has allocated a complementary € 30 million humanitarian aid 
package for the populations affected by the conflict. Through DG ECHO, the EC provided 
humanitarian and early recovery assistance to the returnee population and victims of the conflict. 
Soon after the decision was taken it became evident that many of the needs were already 
addressed by other donors and supporters from the region. The EC showed flexibility and as the 
decision for funding was formulated broadly enough it became possible to finance humanitarian 
demining. Operations funded focused on demarcation, awareness and clearance of unexploded 
munitions, water and sanitation, shelter, and emergency health and food needs.  
According to standard procedures DG ECHO launched a call for proposals and contracted four 
international NGOs (FSD, HI-F, DCA, and MAG) of which two were already in the country and 
two arrived because of the war.49 The operation started with 11 Battle Area Clearance (BAC) 
teams (out of 16) under the coordination of MACC SL. For contractual reasons, the activities 
could only start in January 2007, meaning that DG ECHO funded activities started significantly 
later than the activities of NGOs with access to other funding as well (such as MAG with funding 
from the UK). The delay is at odds with the humanitarian character of the activity.  
The reason for the delay due to contract procedures was the fact that the ECHO emergency 
decision did not include MA at the beginning as it was not possible to judge the scope of the 
                                                     
48
 19 08 05 Rehabilitation and reconstruction in favour of Mediterranean countries and Middle East 
49
 DG ECHO cannot fund LMAC or MACC SL directly as those are military entities.  
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cluster munitions problem in summer 2006. DG ECHO showed flexibility and could fund MA in 
the end; however, the final approval of the decision took until January. For those implementing 
agencies which had to initiate MA in Lebanon from zero the start in January, this meant that 
operations could only begin in spring 2007 after all administrative and logistic set ups were 
arranged.50 
When the 18 months maximum funding duration for DG ECHO contributions approached, the 
government, the EC Delegation and the implementing partners looked for a solution to continue 
funding as the contamination problem was not yet solved (end of 2007).  
At the time of the conflict, the EC was negotiating the new CSP with the government of Lebanon. 
The CSP for 2007-2013 became the first CSP for Lebanon under the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP).51 Its focus lies on immediate reconstruction, but also makes a link between the 
reconstruction needs, the debt problem and conditions for medium-term structural reforms.52 A 
total amount of € 187 million was allocated for the first NIP, covering the period 2007-2010, to 
support these priorities with EU financial assistance from the European ENPI.53 In 2007 80% of 
the total annual allocations and almost two thirds of the annual allocation for 2008 were directed 
to securing the recovery reconstruction of the country.  
 
As a consequence of the need to address the cluster problem in the South, the Lebanese 
government requested that MA be added to the priorities of the CSP. A ‘last-minute’ change of 
the already well-advanced CSP was possible.54 A budget line was shifted from support to private 
sector development to MA. The CSP consequently includes MA as sub-priority 3 with a budget 
of € 14 million.55  This sum was supposed to cover two years (€7 million per year). The first 
tranche was scaled down to € 4 million when it became clear other donors were engaging as well. 
Additional to the clearance activities, the EC started funding the UNDP, which provided 
technical assistance to NDO and, today, to LMAC.  
 
With these allocations in the CSP, continued funding to the MA implementing partners was 
possible beyond February 2008. A ten-month contract was signed to continue the funding of 
clearance teams up to the end of 2008, the end date that was predicted by MACC SL.56 Today the 
end date is predicted for mid-2009 rather than end 2008. The EC allocated the funds for 2009 but 
due to administrative procedures under the ENPI rules, the EC will not be able to spend this 
money before autumn 2009 (or later).  A funding gap will occur between end 2008 and until the 
second tranche of the ENPI funds can be released.  
 
The NGO partners (who came in under DG ECHO and who usually work under DG ECHO 
procedures) are not aware of this potential funding gap and the administrative constraints at the 
EC. The new demining programme is according to the EC – and as decided by LMAC in 
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 One agency started clearance activities in April, which is 8 months after the conflict ended. According to 
statistics from MACC SL the monthly victim rate dropped from 60 in August 2006 to 2 in February 2007 and 
0 in March 2007.   
51
 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/country-cooperation/lebanon/lebanon_en.htm  
52
 http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/lebanon/docs/index_en.htm  
53
 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/partners/enp_lebanon_en.htm  
54
 The ENP is a development tool. EC officials call the instrument “heavy” because of its long procedures 
and the consultation process which it includes (e.g. Member States, EU Parliament). The fact that MA could 
be integrated shows the commitment of those involved.  
55
 “Support for reconstruction and recovery – supporting economic and social recovery and reconstruction, 
local development as well as demining and clearing unexploded ordnance.” Page 4 and 29 
56
 One of the implementing partners had to shift the contract from its Swiss entity to the French entity as 
only the later was eligible for ENPI funding. Under DG ECHO funding this aspect was not of relevance. The 
shift did not cause any difficulties in terms of administration or effectiveness.  
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November 2007 – not supposed to work in the South. If ever the EC decides to work through 
international NGOs, a new call of proposal has to be launched. Although there is regular 
exchange between the NGO partners and the EC delegation57, this issue has not yet been 
discussed clearly enough at the time of the field visit for this study58.  
 
Lebanon is not mentioned in the indicative allocation in the global Mine Action Strategy of the 
EU for 2005 to 2007 although the country is the only country covered by this study where MA is 
mentioned in a CSP. The reason for this incoherence could be the fact that on the one hand the 
country is not a signatory to the APMBC. On the other hand the CSP responds to the changing 
environment in the region and here in particular to the conflict and the new contamination from 
cluster munitions.  
KEY ISSUES 
 
Relevance 
 
Overall the EC funding to Lebanon is relevant. The EC proved to be responsive to the situation 
and to developments in the sector. On the other hand the EC funding is not following a long term 
pro active strategic approach for MA support to Lebanon. The EC funded the MA sector only 
sporadically before the 2006 crisis, increasingly after the crisis and with an open end date today.   
 
The fluid situation in Lebanon makes a flexible approach necessary and the EC showed 
flexibility and responsiveness in particular after the crisis in 2006. Nevertheless the weakness of 
this re-active approach becomes clear today when prolonged funding to the sector and an exit 
strategy require a more strategic and better planned approach. A more comprehensive view on the 
MA problematic in Lebanon and even more flexible instruments might have allowed the EC to 
avoid some difficulties that occur today or might occur in the near future. Efficiency might have 
increased with better planning and the integration of humanitarian demining into the national 
response to the contamination problem might have been possible.  
 
In line with other donors, the EC did not pay much attention to the mine problem in Lebanon 
before the 2006 crisis although this existed and still exists today. The EC then contributed to the 
scaling up of capacities for cluster munitions clearance in the south and of technical assistance to 
the national framework. Today the EC is faced with the challenge of deciding how to finance the 
capacities created and supported after the 2006 crisis, without having a clear concept or an exit 
strategy at hand. A more strategic approach from the beginning and a continuous focus on MA 
based on needs and integrated in national programs as foreseen by the EC global strategy might 
have prevented this.  
 
To integrate humanitarian demining into the national framework and to make the link with other 
MA activities in Lebanon is a challenge. The fact that the predicted end date for the cluster 
clearance has been changed twice has not made it easier to have a plan for the EC and other 
donors.  A number of factors contributed to the fact that the EC intervention did not link with the 
national framework for MA and did not achieve a smooth crossover from the different phases of 
the response (development context before 2006-crisis in 2006-humanitarian intervention in 2006 
and 2007- and finally reconstruction): 
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 Three programs were visited, at least once during the last 10 months.  
58
 All the NGO were according to the EC informed that the new decision would start not before end of 
2009. 
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• The EC intervention followed standard procedures (DG ECHO procedures for 
humanitarian action and EuropeAid procedures for reconstruction and development aid) 
which, on the one hand, could be used flexibly to make funding possible but, on the other 
hand, prevented the EC from looking beyond their intervention and planning more 
strategically.  
• EC procedures limit decision-makers so that some funding options are not possible (e.g. 
not possible to fund MACC SL/UNMAS as part of the peacekeeping forces in the south, 
not possible to fund LMAC directly as it is part of the military) 
• EC ‘standard approach’ is not always adapted to the local situation (e.g. call for proposal 
and contracting a variety of NGOs, some of which need to start operations from zero, 
causing significant delays) 
• Lack of awareness of MA specific problématique (e.g. lack of awareness of the costs 
related to setting up clearance teams; ideas to support local NGOs as part of a LRRD 
strategy, although MA in Lebanon – as in some other countries – is based on military or 
other state structures) 
 
Another example of the missing strategic approach is the funding to UNDP, whose program 
started in 2003 but was funded by the EC in 2008 only. Funding includes components which are 
not fully thought through or based on a national EC strategy for the sector (e.g. the capacity 
building component of two local NGOs for MA).  
 
Efficiency 
 
Regarding the choice of funding channels, the EC was following administrative imperatives more 
than taking strategic decisions. To support the national framework, the EC had to fund through an 
intermediary (here UNDP) as NDO or LMAC were assessed as too weak in terms of capacity to 
procure and contract according to EC rules. For the funding of clearance activities DG ECHO 
had to launch a call for proposals as direct funding to military entities such as LMAC or MACC 
SL was not possible. Later the EC Delegation ‘inherited’ the NGO projects and started funding 
LMAC through UNDP.59  
 
The decision of DG ECHO to fund four international NGOs in 2006 and 2007 instead of one or 
two is questionable in terms of efficiency and integration into longer term planning. Arguments 
such as diversity and limited capacity of the two NGOs already active in the country are 
outweighed by arguments against this set up.60 Each NGO partner had to establish administrative 
and logistical structures, with all related costs. Demining activities are cost intensive as 
specialized equipment is needed, which is not the case for some other humanitarian interventions 
such as food aid distribution. Two ECHO funded NGOs came to Lebanon only for these projects 
and had to start operations from zero. Two of the NGOs only work with EC funds and might have 
difficulties obtaining access to other donor funding in case gaps in EC funding occur. 
 
With a clearer strategic vision and planning for an exit, the decision to support four NGOs might 
have been avoided. Already today, some of the capacities built up with EC funding are lying idle 
(e.g. ambulances of one NGO partner and purchased with EC funds are not in use anymore but 
are parked in the courtyard of this NGO.  
 
                                                     
59
 The fact that the EC first cannot, but later can fund the military shows how absurd the funding restrictions 
under some of the EC budget lines are: also, the fact that the EC supports UNMAS at the global level, which 
managed MACC SL prior to, during and after the summer 2006 conflict.  
60
 The limited capacity of the two existing NGOs – as reported by one interlocutor – was not confirmed 
during interviews with the NGOs. but the question could not be assessed further during this study.  
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Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development  
 
The missing strategic vision and planning for an exit strategy also becomes relevant when it 
comes to Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD). Although the MA 
intervention after the 2006 crisis is without doubt relevant and is contributing to reducing 
suffering, there is no real link between the MA funding and the recovery or reconstruction 
process. The activities for humanitarian demining appear isolated and are not aligned with other 
EC funded programs.  
 
The linkage between clearance activities and other reconstruction programs is limited to the fact 
that agriculture in the clearance areas is an important source of income in the contaminated areas. 
The linkage between MA and development was rated as very important (5 out of 6) in the EC 
questionnaire. As shown in the box below the concept of LRRD is a complex one and requires 
coordination and planning if the linkage between relief, rehabilitation and development is to 
emerge.  
 
Under the ad hoc decision for humanitarian aid in Lebanon € 30 million were allocated for 
programs in the following six areas:61  
• Humanitarian demining 
• Psychosocial activities 
• Livelihood sector 
• Shelter 
• Specific winter assistance 
• Water and sanitation 
• Coordination and protection 
 
These activities are implemented by a wide range of UN agencies and NGOs. In the MA sector 
only DanChurchAid is involved in activities that are not clearance (MRE). DanChurchAid is also 
the only MA NGO involved in other emergency activities (component winter support: 
distribution of diapers, blankets, heater and fuel supply). Otherwise the MA activities are rather 
isolated from other assistance activities. Regardless these parallel structures the EC seems to be 
contented with the linkage.62 
 
Textbox 1 – The EU Policy on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) 
The concept of LRRD originates from the 1980s in response to concerns about the “grey zone” 
between humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation, and development. The instruments and 
working methods used in these different types of assistance programmes differ in time frames, 
implementing partners, the role of national authorities, and the content of interventions.  
 
In 1996, the EC developed a basic rationale for LRRD.* It was acknowledged that short-term 
relief mechanisms do not and, in some cases, cannot systematically take into account long-term 
development issues. At the same time, development policy should better assist countries to deal 
with natural disasters, conflicts and other crises. These deficiencies could be reduced if relief 
and development were appropriately linked, which is not simply a matter of ensuring a smooth 
transition from emergency to development assistance; rather, it includes disaster preparedness 
and preventing/resolving conflicts. 
 
There is no unique model for LRRD. Broad recommendations include: improved donor 
coordination; adjustment of the EU’s own instruments, working methods and internal 
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  See comments in EC questionnaire.  
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mechanisms; avoiding parallel structures for relief and development in a country; and clarifying 
who is responsible for what. 
 
Demining is mentioned in various contexts in the LRRD documents,** which stress the need to 
integrate MA into post-conflict planning and the wider development context. 
 
In theory, LRRD can be promoted within EC Country Strategy Papers (CSP), which analyse all 
aid-relevant aspects in a country and outline a five year plan (indicative programme). The plan 
includes aid provided through all EU mechanisms including the EDF, thematic budget lines, 
ECHO, and the Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM). 
 
* Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation 
and Development (LRRD), COM (1996) 153 final of 30.04.1996. See also, Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament: Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development – An assessment, COM (2001) 
153 final of 23.04.2001 
** In the 1996 document under a separate paragraph “The particular case of anti-personnel mines” (p. 8), and as 
instrument reacting in post-conflict situations (p. 19). The 2001 document also mentions demining under post-conflict 
situation needs (p. 7), and a separate paragraph on demining stresses the importance of integrating demining within the 
CSPs (p. 19). 
 
Coordination  
 
Finally, the coordination of donor activities regarding MA in Lebanon is very week. MACC SL is 
seen as the coordinating body for the activities in the south and UNDP for the rest of the country. 
But donors do not coordinate at the national level, nor on their support to MACC SL or UNDP. 
National interests and procedural constraints dominate the coordination imperatives among 
donors. Donors rely on UNDP and LMAC and their capacity to plan and coordinate. At no point 
has the capacity of the two organizations been assessed systematically; the EC as a donor does 
maintain contact with both, but not at a level to assess the capacity. 
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JORDAN 
CONTEXT 
Jordan has a landmines problem since the 1940s. Mines were laid out in 1948 at the partition of 
Palestine, then during the Arab-Israeli war 1967-1969, and finally during the civil war in 1970. 
 
Minefields are located in the northern area bordering Syria, the Jordan Valley and Wadi Araba. 
Based on military estimates, there were about 305 000 mines laid on Jordan territory, of which 
73,000 were Israeli and 232,000 Jordanian. The entire minefield along the Syrian border was laid 
by Jordanian army and is mapped. Both Jordan and Israel laid mines along the border between 
the two countries. Israel has handed over the mine location maps to the Jordanian authorities. 
Landmines in Jordan are located in the military-controlled border areas, and are marked, mapped 
and partly fenced today.  
 
Since 1993, when humanitarian demining began, 
more than 101,000 mines have been removed and 
25 million m2 cleared, representing 183 of the 497 
minefields.63 Today, all known minefields along 
the Israel/Jordan border are cleared. The remaining 
problem is the 100 km long and approximately 100 
m wide minefield along the Syrian border.  
 
Challenges to clearance are the climatic condition 
(heat), desert sand that buries the mines deeply, 
and flooding that has shifted the position of mines 
and buried others down to 1.5 meters. In addition 
to clearance, a permanent fence will be 
constructed. As a side effect this fence is expected 
to reduce smuggling (which is a problem on routes 
established through the mine fields).   
 
According to the findings of the Jordan retrofit survey (an “LIS light” survey) about 500,000 
people or 8% of the population are affected by mines. The landmine problem has a direct impact 
on the population (however few accidents occur) and affects their agricultural activities. There 
are no solid figures on the numbers of accidents, but it is estimated there have been between 500 
and 800 since the 1960s. Rehabilitation services have been available for mine victims since the 
late 1960s. These services include the provision of prosthetics and reintegration into work.64  
 
Agricultural lands remain uncultivated, irrigation and hydro projects delayed and historical and 
world cultural heritage sites unexplored. Jordan has a high level of poverty and unemployment.65 
The agricultural sector accounts for 3.5 percent of the country’s GDP.66   
THE MINE ACTION PROGRAMME 
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan actively pursues the resolution of its landmine problem. 
Jordan signed and ratified the Ottawa Treaty in 1998. It came into force in May 1999 and hence 
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 http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-fco/country-profiles/middle-east-north-africa/jordan?profile=all  
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 Industry: 10.3%, services: 86.2% (2007 est.); https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/jo.html  
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the completion deadline under Article 5 of the APMBC is May 2009. In compliance with Article 
4 of the convention, Jordan completed its destruction of stockpiles of anti-personnel landmines in 
2003. The civilian-led National Demining and Rehabilitation Committee (NDRC) was 
established by royal decrees issued in 2000 and 2002.67 In June 2005, the five-year national MA 
plan was launched by the NDRC.68 Its goals are to: 
• Develop mine clearance capacity; 
• Develop a database to support all aspects of MA; 
• Develop a coherent national survivor and victim assistance program; 
• Launch nationally coordinated mine risk education;  
• Undertake advocacy for universalisation of the Mine Ban Treaty; and, 
• Develop the NCDR’s capacity to manage all aspects of the MA program. 
The government’s engagement in the landmine cause is also reflected in a number of activities 
such as hosting the Eighth Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC in November 2007. Jordan 
became co-chair of the Standing Committee for Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine 
Action Technologies in December 2005.  
 
NCDR, as the executing agency, has the overall responsibility for the effective management and 
execution of MA in Jordan. NCDR ensures that project outcomes and outputs are achieved and 
reported adequately through periodic reports from the operators. It is accountable for outputs and 
achievements of project objectives. It jointly approves project work plans and activities with the 
UNDP.  
 
The two main executing actors in mine clearance in Jordan today are the REC and Norwegian 
People’s Aid (NPA). NPA became the sole implementing partner for NCDR, which allows for 
good supervision and easy coordination. The REC has done all the clearance in the Jordan 
Valley, an area that will be declared free of all known mine fields by the end of 2008. REC will 
then focus its resources on constructing a new fence along the Syrian border simultaneously with 
NPA mine clearance activities along the border.  
 
To accelerate mine clearance in efforts to meet its Article 5 deadline, Jordan decided that NPA 
should start clearance operations in 2006. Clearance was previously carried out by army 
engineers only. REC, as the national capacity, will continue to respond to reports of single mines 
(it is still a problem with mines washed into the Jordan Valley (riverbed) on Jordan territory from 
the minefields on the Israel side of the river). REC has also been the main supplier of experienced 
staff to NCDR.  
 
UNDP works with NCDR at the strategy/policy level and supports NCDR in donor relations. 
Most of the funding to MA is now channelled through UNDP. UNDP employs a full time project 
manager to administrate a grant from the EC. A CTA position is funded by Norway. 
EC SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION 
The EU is a long-standing partner of Jordan and aims use a range of instruments, including 
financial assistance, to build on past co-operation in support of Jordan’s reform plans. Jordan was 
one of the first countries to sign an Association Agreement (AA) and is among the five countries 
which have expressed an interest in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and have adopted 
                                                     
67
 http://ncdr.org.jo/  
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 http://ncdr.org.jo/aboutus.php?$mainlink=About_Us&$contentlink=About_Us;  the plan has a budget of 
US$47.79 million for the five years. A strategy and annual plan for mine risk education was agreed as well. 
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a three-year ENP Action Plan in 2005. A total amount of € 265 million will be allocated for the 
first NIP, covering 2007-2010. The priority areas are political reform and good governance, trade 
and investment development, sustainability of the development process, institution building, 
financial stability and support to regulatory reform.  
National governments and the EC reported contributing US$1,464,826 for MA in Jordan in 2005, 
a decrease from 2004.69 The EC donated € 800.000 through UNDP to the NCDR for technical 
survey, demining and training of deminers.70 The funding covers 75% of the overall costs of the 
action. Funding is for the period from late December 2005 to end 2007, and was completed by 
June 2008. 71,72 Funding to UNDP was earmarked for clearance. The decision on funding was 
taken in Brussels.  
The objectives of the UNDP funded programme (called The North Shunah Mine Clearance 
Project) were to: 
o Develop and train on National Mine Action Standards and Quality Assurance 
o Procure Mine Clearance Equipment & Spares 
o Technically Survey contaminated areas 
o Support Mixed Mine Clearance (Manual & Mechanical) 
o Undertake Quality Assurance & Quality Control  
 
The EC monitors the programme in a limited way, focusing on administrative and financial 
control (financial reporting and auditing). All technical aspects are left to UNDP and NCDR.  
KEY ISSUES 
 
Relevance 
 
EC funding of MA in Jordan is highly relevant. Both politically (APMBC obligations and 
relation to its neighbouring countries) and economically (the mine fields are mostly in fertile 
areas – a scarce resource in Jordan) the mine clearance operation is important. 
 
Jordan has today managed to secure from its own budget and from external sources the funds 
needed to end the landmine problem. With the three year extension request, Jordan should be able 
to declare itself free of all known mined areas within its jurisdiction by 2012. Jordan has 
impressive statistics regarding the number of mines destroyed, the areas released and the related 
cost-effectiveness ratio. By funding MA in Jordan, the EC is contributing to this process.  
 
MA is not mentioned in any of the EU strategy or planning documents for Jordan.73  The EC 
global MA strategy has not been used as the basis for designing the EU funded programme in the 
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 http://www.icbl.org/lm/country/jordan 
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 The sources of the funding remained unclear. Some stated that funding came from the thematic budget 
line for MA. Other said it was taken from a budget line for the development of the agricultural sector in 
Jordan.  
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 A new contract has been signed in May 2008 for the clearance of the Northern border to Syria (€ 4,5 mill 
over 24 months-ENPI/2008/154932)). The initiative for this funding originates from Brussels and the 
lobbying of Prince Mired of NCDR for funding the MA activities in Jordan.   
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 http://www.undp-
jordan.org/UNDPinJordan/WhatWeDo/CrisisPreventionandRecovery/MineAction/tabid/121/Default.aspx 
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 The CSP 2007-2013 including the NIP; the NIP 2005-2006; EC annual reports; and the ENP reports for 
2002, 2003, 2004 do not include a reference to MA.  
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reporting period covered. The fact that the EU is supporting MA in Jordan stems from the 
government’s engagement in the APMBC and from good personal contacts.  
 
The positive impact of MA is relatively clear – removal of a permanent threat to life and 
development. The EC has channelled all its funds to clearance and nothing to the other pillars of 
MA. This is the right choice as MRE/VA is of limited need in Jordan if the threat is eliminated 
reasonably fast. Additionally, VA is covered by royal charities.  
 
Effectiveness and Efficiency 
 
So far as could be assessed during the field visit, the Northern Shauna project ending in 2008 has 
met all its objectives. The project focused on clearance of 12 minefields in the Jordan Valley. 
These, and three other minefields, were cleared within the framework of the project.  
 
NCDR has become a competent organisation. This is mainly due to its positive attitude towards 
new ideas and its capability to combine the experience of REC and NPA. NCDR has a 
comprehensive and qualified QA/monitoring capacity to oversee REC and NPA in the field. By 
funding NCDR through UNDP, the EC is contributing to these achievements. 
 
It is too early to assess the effectiveness of the new grant of € 4,5 million signed in early May 
2008. However, the process leading to the signature was said to be unsatisfactory for the partners 
(UNDP, NCDR) and other donors involved. It was reported that the EC was not communicating 
clearly on the decision making process, so that for some time it was uncertain whether continuing 
funding was possible or not. The risk of a funding gap or double funding from other donors 
became an issue.  
 
NCDR, through REC and NPA, has introduced innovative methods to make MA cost efficient. 
NCDR has also adapted the “land release concept” that allows for a rapid release of land and 
ensure mine clearance assets are focused on areas with a confirmed presence of mines. It was a 
vital decision to take if Jordan wanted to become mine free within reasonable time. NCDR chose 
an NGO as a partner instead of building on REC or developing its own clearance asset such as is 
the case in Yemen.  
 
By contributing to NCDR, the EC has shared in this process. However, EC support is provided 
indirectly through UNDP, which influences efficiency. The set up implies, for example, 
additional management costs (in-country and at the HQ level).  The EC monitored the project 
only at an administrative level (reporting according to EC regulations). On the operational and 
technical side, the EC was not engaged.  
 
UNDP is perceived to have the competence and experience to oversee and administer the funds. 
UNDP has a competent MA technical advisor in country, who plays a key role in fundraising, 
capacity building, coordination and overall quality assurance. The UNDP TA is an important 
“negotiator/facilitator” between (international) operators and national authorities.  
 
NCDR hosts regular donor meetings, but these seem more an information/fundraising event 
where all current/potential donor countries are invited. These meetings are less an arena for 
discussions or dialogue, and no minutes are taken. Currently there is very little coordination 
among the donors.  
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Sustainability and Link to Development  
 
Neither in any of the EC strategy papers for Jordan nor in the project document with the UNDP 
project is there any direct link between MA and the development process. Without going into 
detail, the grant application refers to socio-economic development and regional peace building 
benefits, which are viewed as being substantial.  The longer term impact of the project appears to 
be highly tangible as the land and water resources that will be freed through the project will be 
put into productive use immediately, thereby contributing to the Government’s national poverty 
reduction strategy and it’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).  
 
The programme itself however is limited to the clearance activities and on capacity development 
of the counterpart. The project does not foresee any activities directly related to the use for the 
land, neither has a linkage to another initiative that would bridge to a follow-up.  
 
Regarding the capacity development component, there will be no need to have a large national 
capacity once the clearance of the northern border is done. Jordan will be “mine free” and the 
REC is more than capable to deal with single devices that will be discovered in the years to come 
(e.g. Israeli mines that cross the border with flooding). 
 
NCDR and the GoJ have the vision to establish a regional MA capacity. There is already a plan 
and a dialogue established with GICHD and James Madison University (USA) to establish a 
training centre in Jordan. The purpose is, for example, to undertake mid-management courses for 
MA personnel in the Middle East. It remains to be seen how far this plan and the activities take 
off.  
 
Coherence and Coordination 
 
NPA is the sole operator and NCDR will do the QA/QC of the operations. The key staff within 
NPA (national programme manager, senior technical advisor, operational coordinator, 
international relations) are all ex NCDR – ensuring a transparent and good dialogue between 
NPA and NCDR. In theory, this is a straightforward task with only one objective – clearance of 
all the mines within the treaty deadline. 
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YEMEN 
CONTEXT 
As a result of several conflicts, including the 1962-1975 war in the north between republicans 
and royalists, the 1963-1967 war of independence in the south, the 1970-1983 war against left-
wing guerrillas and the 1994 Separatist War, Yemen is contaminated with both antipersonnel and 
anti-vehicle mines and other ERW. Most landmines were laid in pre-unification border areas 
between northern and southern Yemen.74 
 
A Landmine Impact Survey conducted in 2000 
serves as the primary source of information for 
MA planning.  
 
According to this survey, 592 communities 
were affected by landmines (1078 suspected 
hazard areas) covering an area of approx 923 
km2 directly affecting approx 6% of the 
population (14 communities with a population 
of approximately 36,000 with high impact and 
578 communities with a population of 791,400 
seen as medium to low impact). By June 2007, 
419 km2 remained to be cleared.75 
 
The scope of the problem has been reduced since the finalisation of the 2000 LIS project through 
a combination of clearance and technical survey (area reduction and cancellation). However 
casualties continued to occur in 2007, and at a higher rate than in 2006. In 2007 there were said to 
be four to six new casualties per month (48-72 annually) but there is some uncertainty about 
figures of casualties so that the total number of mine/UXO casualties today and over the past 
years is not known.76 A recent report by YEMAC speaks of 5,000 casualties over the past 10 
years.77 
 
In 2006, a livelihoods analysis of mine-affected communities in Yemen was undertaken. 
According to the study “landmines and ERW have an impact on infrastructure development, 
which is denying people access to economic opportunities.”78 The blockage of agricultural lands, 
irrigation sources and grazing areas results in economic losses. Only 2.6% of Yemen’s land is 
arable.  
THE MINE ACTION PROGRAM 
The Government of Yemen is committed to eliminate the impact of mines and UXO in Yemen. 
The National Mine Action Committee (NMAC-established in 1998) oversees the Yemen 
Executive Mine Action Centre (YEMAC), which is in charge of implementing the plans and 
policies approved by NMAC. 
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The Republic of Yemen signed the APMBC on December 1997 and it entered into force on 1 
March 1999.79 Yemen’s National Mine Action Strategic Plan initially covered the period 2001-
2005. Based on a LIS it was revised in June 2004 to cover the period 2004-2009. The plan’s 
vision is to “put an end to the suffering of the people and the casualties caused by antipersonnel 
mines in mine-affected areas by the end of March 2009.”80 This year however Yemen has asked 
for a six year extension. Although called “one of the best demining programs in the world”, the 
program faced some financial and technical obstacles. Repeatedly the program has had funding 
shortfalls (e.g. in 2003 and again in 2005). According to YEMAC for example in 2005 the total 
amount to implement the activities was USD 3,500,000 of which Yemen received only USD 
1,800,000.81 Technical obstacles are for example the fact that many mines are laid out in 
mountainous areas and Yemen still lacks the appropriate demining technology to deal with 
magnetic and iron soils. 
 
The planned budget for the period 2009 is USD 31,216,667 of which USD 10,495,000 is planned 
as donor contributions.82  
 
In compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty, Yemen destroyed all stockpile antipersonnel landmines 
on 27 April 2002 and developed and enforced landmine legislation in the country since January 
2005. 
 
Mine clearance in Yemen is undertaken solely by YEMAC involving staff seconded from the 
Engineering Department of the Ministry of Defence. Since the establishment of the above-
mentioned institutions, the Government of Yemen has seconded about 1.000 military personnel 
as deminers and other operational staff in support of MA activities nationwide. Yemen provides 
USD 3,500,000 per year since 1999 to cover salaries, insurance, social security, compensation 
and field allowances, food, and premises.83  
YEMAC has adopted a “cluster clearance approach”. The focus is on communities clustered 
close to each other, no matter whether they are high impact communities or medium and low-
impact communities.  
With support of UNDP, Yemen capacities and human resources has been established and trained 
to international recognised standard. MA in Yemen is now undertaken with no international 
advisors and there is national ownership to the program.  
 
The Yemeni Landmine/UXO Victim Assistance Program was established in 1999 as an integral 
part of YEMAC. The Mid-Term Evaluation of YEMAC Phase II found this Program to be “one 
of the most advanced in the world”, with some 1200 victims having been identified and 286 
treated medically between 2001 and 2005.84 According to a recent study there are nevertheless 
some doubts regarding the program’s coverage, which to date is limited. Very few of the 
survivors had received significant help apart from emergency medical care.85   
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There are two local NGOs involved in MA: Yemen Association for Landmines Survivors and 
Yemen Mine Awareness Association. Both are working under YEMAC coordination.  
EC SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION 
The direct EC support to MA in Yemen is limited to the funding of a UNDP programme, which 
has been running since 1999. The EC supports Phase III of the programme (“Support to eliminate 
the impact from mines and ERW in Yemen”).86 It was signed within the MAP Annual Work 
Program for 2006 and the corresponding call for proposals.87  
 
The UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) executed the first phase of the project from 1999 to 
2003. During this phase the first UN certified LIS was completed, the above-mentioned Five-
Year Strategic Mine Action Plan was developed, Mine Clearance Units and Technical Survey 
Teams created and trained, highly mine impacted communities cleared and mine awareness 
activities implemented.  
 
During the second phase from October 2003 until the end of 2006, which was later extended to 
2007, the capacity building process as well as clearance and MRE continued. 
 
An evaluation of YMAP was carried out in 2001. In 2002 the UNDP Mine Action Team 
conducted an assessment of the status of the program and in 2005 UNDP undertook a mid-term 
evaluation. Results of the assessments were positive overall.  
 
Phase three focuses on Yemen having a fully national MA program, with UNDP providing only 
modest support, mainly resource mobilization. The last UNDP chief technical advisor left Yemen 
in August 2006, although a programme officer remains within the UNDP Yemen office. 
 
The decision to fund this MA activity in Yemen was taken in Brussels with the involvement of 
the EC delegation in Amman which was overseeing the EC office in Yemen at the time. The 
contract was given directly to UNDP without a call for proposals as there are no eligible 
alternatives in Yemen.  
KEY ISSUES 
 
Baseline data and estimation of end date 
 
In Yemen the government, donors and operators have, as in a number of other countries, based 
their estimation of the size (extent) of the mine problem on the findings from a LIS (the scope of 
the problem were estimated to 923 km2). However, a known weakness with the LIS approach is 
that it overestimates the mine problem as non-technical people are tasked to estimate the size of a 
suspect hazard area. 
 
In Yemen there was a need to follow up the LIS with a technical survey. The nationwide 
technical survey finished in 2008 has lead to a reduction of the original suspect hazard areas to 
less than 10% of original size. The approach to base initial funding on LIS is appropriate. 
However the example of Yemen shows that the LIS only gives an indication of the impact of 
mines (at the time of the survey), but limited knowledge of the physical extent of the problem. 
Promotion and funding of technical surveys is important for national authorities and donors. 
Without a comprehensive/nation-wide technical survey the scope of the problem will remain 
unknown and end date will be at best a qualified guess. The same weakness in baseline data 
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applies for the number of casualties occurred during the last ten years.  
 
Prioritisation  
 
There has been no EC funding for MA in Yemen prior to 2007 although the situation in Yemen 
was eligible under the EC strategy for MA for 2002-2004. Yemen fell under both the thematic 
(elimination of AP Landmine/UXO threat and the alleviation of its effects and creation and 
reinforcement of local capacity and MA efficiency and effectiveness) and the geographic 
priorities of the strategy (country severely to moderately affected by APL/UXO problem; 
prioritization of the problem within the national framework). On the other hand Yemen is not as 
strategically important for the EU as other countries in the region.88 The MA sector also has to 
“compete” with other sectors in Yemen as poverty and the need for support is big. The EC 
decided to prioritize the health sector.  
 
Mainstreaming 
 
MRE and VA are pillars of MA in Yemen (Strategic Objective Three in the UNDP Program 
Phase III). There is a potential for mainstreaming and integration into already existing national 
structures or other development projects. Regarding prioritisation, the EC in its country strategy 
for Yemen has made the choice to put an emphasis on the health sector. The health sector in 
Yemen is established and there is potential for better integrating care for mine survivors. MRE 
could be better integrated into school curriculum or transferred to existing NGOs already 
established without the need of international funds.  
 
The EC is funding other sectors in Yemen and contributes to the reduction of poverty, but there is 
no linkage between this funding and the funding to MA. The support to MA in Yemen is isolated 
from other EC funding to Yemen. MA is not mentioned in any of the CSP or NIP covering the 
evaluation period.89 DG ECHO is implementing a humanitarian program covering the health 
sector, refugees, social support, water & sanitation. Again there is no link to MA.  
 
Donor coordination and monitoring 
 
Currently there is virtually no coordination among donors regarding MA and limited interaction 
between donors and YEMAC or NMAC.90 One of the reasons for this is the funding channel, 
which goes via UNDP in New York. Most contracts are negotiated from capitals and the funds 
are mainly thematic funds/earmarked MA budget lines. There is no or very limited knowledge of 
the MA programme at the embassy level (including the EC delegation). Embassies in Yemen do 
not feel responsible for the programme and are confident in UNDP’s capabilities to oversee the 
programme in an appropriate manner. UNDP approves the project and work plan, ensures 
appropriate project appraisal and capacity assessment, coordinates auditing process, monitoring, 
evaluation and validation, and ensures financial and substantive oversight. 
 
Donor funding to MA in Yemen is handled from distance and characterized by good national 
ownership. However the development of mine clearance still needs attention and with the current 
clearance rate and delays 
 
YEMAC has sent forward an extension request based on extensive international funding to 
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finalise within a six year timeframe. However, it is clear that the donors have not been engaged in 
the development of the extension request or committed funds for the coming years. 
IRAQ 
CONTEXT 
Iraq is one of the countries most severely affected by landmines and ERW as a result of internal 
conflicts, the war with Iran, the first Gulf War, and the conflict that began in 2003. Since the 
2003 invasion, almost daily attacks with car bombs or other improvised explosive devices, 
targeted at civilians, the military and police, and at the Coalition Forces indicate that huge 
amounts of abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) were left unsecured after the overthrow of the 
Saddam Hussein regime and subsequently, plundered, for use ongoing insurgencies.  
Although there have been several mine/ERW 
contamination surveys, the Iraq LIS (partly funded 
by the EC) is the first comprehensive national 
survey of mine/UXO contamination. The data 
collection started in 2004 and ended in April 2006 
and includes 13 of Iraq’s 18 governorates.  
According to the LIS there is mine/ERW 
contamination in the southern region (854.5 km2), 
the south-centre region (87.6 km2) and in the 
northern region (776 km2).91  
Types of contamination and impact vary significantly  
between the regions. The Kurdistan region, comprising the governorates of Erbil, Dahuk and 
Sulaymaniyah, is one of the most seriously mine-contaminated areas in the world. It has 1,428 
affected communities and contends with thousands of tactical minefields on the borders with Iran 
and Turkey.  
There is further mine contamination along the Green Line, the former frontline between Kurdish 
forces and Saddam Hussein’s army, as well as UXO across all three governorates. South-central 
Iraq and the southern governorates of Basra, Thi Qar and Missan also have minefields on the 
border with Iran from the 1980-1988 war.  
Cluster munitions and unexploded air and ground ordnance used by Coalition Forces in their 
advance on Baghdad, together with huge quantities of ordnance abandoned by the Iraqi army, 
have been the major cause of casualties.92 Recent studies have reported at least 800,000 metric 
tons of unexploded ordnance (UXO) in and around Basra; this is mainly unused munitions; 
bombs, rockets and mortars discarded by fleeing Iraqi troops.93 
There are no comprehensive statistics about casualties. The LIS (which does not cover all 
governorates) indicated that there are approximately 300 casualties per year in surveyed affected 
communities.  
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THE MINE ACTION PROGRAM 
The Republic of Iraq acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty in August 2007, becoming the 155th State 
Party. The treaty came into force on 1 February 2008. 
The Iraq’s National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) was established in 2003, within the 
Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation. It had responsibility for MA policy, 
planning, coordination and managing the budget for MA and for donor relations. The work of 
NMAA has been affected by corruption, political turbulence, changes of management and 
insecurity (kidnapping). Finally in June 2007 the Council of Ministers closed down the NMAA 
within the MoPDC. 
Although the NMAA was created as the authority for the whole of Iraq, in 2004 the Kurdish 
Regional Government assumed responsibility for MA in the three northern governorates of Erbil, 
Dahuk and Sulaymaniyah. 
UNDP has provided institutional development and local capacity development support to the 
NMAA and regional MA centres. UNDP works with one institutional and one senior technical 
advisor based in Amman. Both make frequent visits to Iraq. In March 2006 UNDP deployed a 
full-time national advisor to northern Iraq to support the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Center 
(IKMAC) and the General Directorate for Mine Action (GDMA). It also contracted national 
advisers to support the NMAA in Baghdad and Regional Mine Action Center (RMAC) South in 
Basra. RONCO, a US commercial clearance company, provided technical support to the NMAA 
until the end of September 2006 and continued to support RMAC South until July 2007, when its 
adviser moved to Baghdad.  
Demining in Iraq is conducted by international forces and the national military, NGOs and 
commercial demining operators. A number of international NGOs are present in the country (for 
example MAG, DCA, the German NGO HELP, Danish Demining Group, Intersos, ICRC and 
NPA). A number of commercial companies are involved in clearance and technical advice (e.g. 
Ronco, Tetra Tech ECI). The Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Centre employed nearly 800 
operations staff in 61 MA teams in the Kurdish governorates of Erbil and Dahuk at the start of 
2006.  
Regarding MRE UNICEF assumed de facto coordination of activities in 2007. UNICEF 
cooperates with NGOs (e.g. Intersos). 
EC SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION 
The EC’s support to MA in Iraq is limited to the years 2003 and 2004 (funding decisions in 
2003).94 In total there were ten projects funded with a total amount of 9.870.000 Euro. The 
funding is divided among AIDCO (funding to UNDP) and DG ECHO (funding to NGOs for 
Humanitarian MA).  
 
In 2004 the World Bank and the UN created the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for 
Iraq (IRFFI) and the EC contributed to IFRRI.95  
 
The EC has signed a Contribution Agreement with UNDP for a total of € 2 million for MA 
activities.96 The funds were channelled through UNDP’s Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis 
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Prevention and Recovery (TTF). The funding was part of a larger contribution with a total of € 29 
million Euros for recovery activities.97 In addition to this EC contribution, UNDP Iraq also 
received funds from other donors through the MA service line of the CPR Thematic Trust Fund.98 
 
The objective of the EC-funded programme was the provision of technical and management 
support to the implementation of a LIS, building of local/national MA capacities and 
procurement/provision of necessary MA equipment in Iraq. Programme implementation was 
constrained by the deteriorating security situation at the time and the limited communication 
possible between UNDP and NMAA. The most significant outcome of the program was the LIS.  
 
The Progress Report for the programme states: “The activities under this agreement are to be 
implemented exclusively by UNDP.”99 However, at the time UNDP could not deploy 
international staff into Iraq. To do the LIS international expertise was required. To overcome the 
problem, UNDP through UNOPS contracted to the US Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation 
(VVAF) for the provision of Senior Technical Advisor for the Landmine Impact Survey.   
 
Regarding further activities under the programme, it is unclear what has been funded by the EC 
and what from other sources. UNDP reporting allocates funding to individual activities. As 
known from other Trust Funds, this is rather artificial and the example of UNDP in Iraq shows it 
is not always correct. The amounts stated exceed the total EC contribution and the activities do 
not match the funding purpose as intended (LIS and Mine Action Capacity Building): 
 
Table 5 – UNDP MA activities in Iraq and EC funding  
Activity EC funding according to report100 
Contract Danish Demining Group to continue 
with clearance operations in the Basrah area 
from end of September 2004 
$650,000 – EC Funding 
Establishment of a local demining NGO in 
the Basrah area through an international 
NGO/Commercial Company in November 
2004  
 
$2,000,000 - $1,300,000 EC Funding 
Continue funding the LIS Team Leader 
through VVAF until May 2005  
$270,000  
 Total EC funding: $2,220,000 
 
The funding to NGOs could not be assessed as the evaluation team did not get access to files and 
could not visit Iraq.101  
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Table 6 – ECHO MA funding to NGOs in Iraq 
Partner Funding Decision Amount 
HI-F ECHO/IRQ/210/2003/04002 Emergency 
humanitarian aid for the people affected by 
landmines and unexploded ordnance 
700.000 Euro 
HI-F ECHO/IRQ/210/2003/06020 Explosive remnants of 
war clearance Baghdad 
446.000 Euro 
DCA ECHO/IRQ/210/2003/04006 Humanitarian Mine 
Action Response in Southern Iraq  
1.570.000 Euro 
Danish Refugee Council (Danish 
Demining Group) 
ECHO/IRQ/210/2003/04004 Quick response teams 1.100.000 Euro 
Danish Refugee Council (Danish 
Demining Group) 
ECHO/IRQ/210/2003/06007 Capacity Building of 
multi skilled EOD teams 
559.954 Euro 
Intersos ECHO/IRQ/210/2003/04001 Mine Action Rapid 
Response 
800.000 Euro 
MAG ECHO/IRQ/210/2003/04003 Emergency Mine Action 718.761 Euro 
MAG ECHO/IRQ/210/2003/06010 Humanitarian Mine 
Action 
430.989 Euro 
NPA ECHO/IRQ/210/2003/04005 Support to Emergency 
Landmine and UXO preventive measures  
1.000.000 Euro 
 Total 7.325.704 Euro 
 
 
In 2006 international donations totalling $35,288,325 (€28,089,091) for MA in Iraq were 
reported by 14 countries, an increase of some 27 percent from 2005 ($27.8 million provided by 
14 countries).102 The list of donating countries include among non-EU countries the US, 
Australia, Switzerland and Norway, and from the EU, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, and Spain. 
 
MA projects under IRFFI are included in Cluster A called Agriculture, Food Security, 
Environment and Natural Resource Management, and involve either UNDP or UNOPS: 
 
Table 7 – MA programmes under IRFFI in Iraq 
Title Budget 
US$ 
Agency Approval 
date 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) capacity building 
and clearance   
3,340,612 UNOPS 11.11.04 
Support to the Iraq-Kurdistan Mine Action Centre 2,921,852 UNOPS 16.03.06 
Strengthening of National Mine Action Organization In 
Southern Iraq 
3,195,797 UNDP 28.09.06 
Support for Rural Development and Safer 
Environment through Mine Action 
3,231,751 UNDP 04.10.07 
 
KEY ISSUE 
Regarding EC funding for Iraq, the dominant feature is that the EC declared it would not fund 
operations after 2003. This decision was linked to the security situation and the fact that the EC 
cannot ensure proper monitoring and financial oversight without a presence in the country. The 
decision is not specific for the MA sector: nevertheless the decision affects the MA sector and 
raises some doubts. The following issues can be listed: 
 
• The decision not to fund humanitarian demining is not based on the need for demining. 
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The need to demine did not end in 2003.103  
• Whereas a long list of donors (European and non-European) are funding MA programs in 
Iraq, the EC – one of the main humanitarian donors in the world – is no longer funding. 
If the funding procedures of European donors as well as those of the UN allow support to 
MA programs in Iraq, it seems odd that this is impossible for the EC.  
• The operators that received funding until 2003 are still present in the country and 
continue the work with funds from other donors but are unable to address all needs 
because of the extent of the problem.  
• In the three other countries covered by this evaluation, the EC is ‘delegating’ oversight 
and monitoring to the UN (UNDP). This was the case in Iraq as well but only until 2003.  
 
7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
In the following conclusions from the above observations are listed. Each conclusion is followed 
by at least one recommendation. Recommendations are repeated if they stem from more than one 
conclusion.  
 
1. EC funding to the region is relevant overall. Funding decisions are taken either at the country 
level or in Brussels, which is appropriate. The EU does not follow a regional strategy or approach 
for the Middle East. The few regional aspects of MA in the Middle East are outweighed by 
national elements (national strategies, national actors), so that there is no need for a regional 
approach to MA.  
 
 The EC should continue to work with national approaches in the Middle East and does 
not need to think about a regional strategy for MA.  
 
2. The global EC strategy does not play an important role in determining funding decisions. The 
global strategy is little known among EC officials and other actors in MA in the region. Some 
who work with the global strategy see the global EC strategy as to general to guide decision-
making. The global strategy is more important at the Brussels level than at country level. Some 
EC officials perceive strategic planning and decision taking in the MA sector as difficult due to 
the technical aspects and sector specifications.  
 
 The EC should consider more specific guidance to those who are dealing with planning 
and MA strategies at national level.  
 Guidance could have various forms and could come from a more specific strategy 
document, from guidelines that are coming with the global strategy, from experts (in-
house or external), or from compilations of best practice examples.  
 To achieve better guidance in MA for the EC delegations, the EC should consider a focal 
point at the Brussels level or in the region.  
 Alternatively or additionally, EC officials working in EC delegations could be 
encouraged and guided to make increased use of external expertise. External expertise for 
strategies and planning could have various forms and could be requested from various 
sources.  
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3. Funding to MA in the Middle East is fragmented. In some cases the funding is not coherent. 
Only some common aspects can be identified: 
 Funding through the UN in all four countries 
 Differentiation between countries in crisis and countries with a more stable environment: 
o In the countries with a stable environment, the EC provides low profile support to 
the countries’ efforts to comply with the APMBC; funding is rarely provided 
continuously but is limited to one project and/or a maximum of three years 
o In countries in crisis, the EC reacts quickly regardless of the countries’ 
commitment to the APMBC; more funds are provided for humanitarian demining 
than for support to activities in the region related to the APMBC.  
 
 In countries with a stable environment, the EC should follow the global strategy in a 
more coherent way. If the EC decides to support a country’s effort in fulfilling the 
APMBC obligations this should be done coherently and based on a strategic approach.  
 In countries with an ongoing or recent crisis the EC should continue to fund MA quickly 
and flexibly regardless of the countries’ commitment to the APMBC but without 
neglecting opportunities for LRRD.  
 
4. Humanitarian Demining is important in the region. Despite being mentioned in the recent EC 
global MA strategy, there is no specific strategy for humanitarian demining, nor any guidelines or 
a concept on how to integrate humanitarian demining into a reconstruction context.  
 
 The EC should put a higher emphasis on humanitarian demining and in particular on the 
challenge of LRRD related to demining. The EC should consider a specific sectoral 
strategy for humanitarian demining and related guidelines. To achieve these aspects, DG 
ECHO should consider a focal point for MA at Brussels level.  
 
5. The EC generally supports assessments of the MA problem in the region, in particular by 
funding LIS. In some contexts the baseline data, methodology and quality of assessments is 
insufficient in terms of comprehensiveness and reliability. This is true for both contamination and 
the number of casualties.  
 
 The EC should continue to fund assessments in MA. The EC should, in its own 
programming but also when coordinating with other actors in MA, increasingly stress the 
need to base funding decisions on reliable data.  
 In case reliable data is unavailable, the EC should support data collection and analysis in 
the region to a larger extent than is currently the case.  
 
6. The emphasis of funding is on clearance which is appropriate overall. In three of the four 
countries, a landmine/UXO free country is a realistic option in the medium-term. 
 
 In the four countries assessed, the EC should continue (or in the case of Iraq, start) to 
focus funding on clearance activities.  
 
7. EC funding to MA is not explicitly integrated into wider national reconstruction or 
development strategies. Links of MA programmes to other EC funded programmes are not 
considered consistently. MA programmes contribute to the reconstruction and development 
process, e.g. by making scarce agricultural land accessible. The linking however is limited in the 
sense that MA programmes take place in the wider reconstruction and development context but 
there is no joint planning for broader results or specific emphasis or measures on linkages 
between programmes. After the land is made accessible there is no follow-up through other 
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initiatives or any other link to reconstructions or development programmes. Actors and donors 
seem to be satisfied with this level of coordination. 
 
 Where the EC is funding programmes which do not only have a focus on fast clearance 
of contaminated sites, the EC should increase efforts to link MA to reconstruction and 
development goals. The EC should not agree to fund standalone MA within a 
reconstruction or development context but should encourage actors to plan specifically 
for joint goals and achievements under MA and reconstruction or development 
programmes.  
 
8. Even in the Lebanon example, where ENPI funded humanitarian demining for an extended 
period, the realisation of the LRRD concept remains a challenge. Whereas DG ECHO procedures 
are flexible and comparably fast, procedures for other instruments are inflexible and too slow. 
The Stability Instrument, as a new instrument, seems to be the right tool to react flexibly but is 
not meant to be used to fill all gaps that might occur. The Stability Instrument is not well known 
outside the EC, and not known in detail by some inside the EC.  
 
 The EC in the Middle East should put a higher emphasis on humanitarian demining and 
in particular on the challenge of LRRD related to demining. The EC should consider a 
specific sectoral strategy for humanitarian demining and related guidelines.  
 The EC should continue to promote knowledge about new EC instruments inside and 
outside the EC.  
 
9. With an annual percentage between 0% and 10% of the overall EC funding to MA in the 
world, the Middle East is not a priority region for MA. Before and after the cancellation of the 
thematic budget line, EC officials did not pay much attention to MA in the region (with the 
exception of humanitarian demining). Today, EC officials deal with MA as part of their portfolio 
and the level of engagement depends partly on personal interest and prioritisation of the 
individual. The MA sector has to “compete” with other sectors at country level when it comes to 
the development and negotiation of CSP.  
 
 The EC should continue to fund MA in the region until all countries have fulfilled their 
treaty obligations.  
 If the EC is funding MA in the region, it should be strategic and properly followed-up. 
To facilitate strategic planning and oversight, the EC should consider a focal point at 
Brussels level or in the region.  
 
10. Funding of the EC and of Member States is overall coherent when it comes to selecting target 
countries, objectives and approaches. The most significant divergence is the case of Iraq, where 
EU Member States fund humanitarian demining but the EC does not.  
 
 The EC should reconsider its strategy regarding funding to MA in Iraq.  
 
11. Coherence in funding to MA in the region is achieved despite the lack of coordination 
mechanisms in the countries, the region, or at European capital level. The APMBC and 
instruments provide the overall coordination framework for donors, including the EC and 
Member States.  
 
There is, nevertheless, a declared interest and potential benefit from information exchange and 
coordination between the EC and Member States (as it used to be in the past). This could enhance 
donor complementarities and avoid funding gaps. This is only possible if donors exchange 
information about their programmes and funding options. For Member States, information 
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exchange and coordination could be achieved without much effort as focal points for MA within 
the government are in place.  
 
 The EC should consider increased information exchange and coordination with EU 
Member States without creating a mechanism that would duplicate coordination under 
the APMBC.  
 To facilitate information exchange between the EC and Member States, the EC should 
consider a focal point at Brussels level.  
 
12. Direct funding to NGOs is generally provided only for humanitarian demining. The procedure 
and management follows DG ECHO standard procedures, which is not always appropriate as MA 
operations have some features that are different from other sectors. This is particularly the case 
for the high start up costs (purchase of specialised and expensive equipment). There is good 
contact between the EC and NGOs at national level. The level of knowledge about ways of 
working and procedures at both sides, the EC and the NGOs, could nevertheless be improved.  
 
 DG ECHO should consider a specific sectoral strategy for humanitarian demining 
including related specific guidelines and procedures. 
 To facilitate information exchange between the EC and NGOs, the EC should consider a 
focal point at Brussels level or in the region.  
 
13. The EC, as well as other donors, face difficulties in responding to the challenge of cluster 
munitions. Weak assessments and difficulties in determining realistic end dates for clearance 
activities are a challenge for donors. 
 
 The EC should learn from the response to the cluster munitions problem in South 
Lebanon and ensure that, in future contexts, the lessons learnt are applied. This could be 
done by developing specific guidelines for cluster munitions problems or by developing 
compilations of good practices.  
 
14. By choosing the UN (and in particular UNDP) for the support to national structures, the EC 
follows a low profile approach in the region. The level of programme ownership, oversight and 
strategic influence is very low. This approach is not consistent with the fact that in Iraq the EC is 
not engaged because of the restriction in monitoring and overseeing the activities. The approach 
is also not coherent with the fact that the UN (in particular UNMAS as part of the peacekeeping 
forces) in South Lebanon,, for procedural reasons, could not be funded by the EC during the 
emergency phase.  
 
 The EC should apply a coherent approach when it comes to requirements for oversight 
and programme ownership. In particular in Iraq, the EC should reconsider the decision 
not to fund MA (or other humanitarian activities) because of the difficulties in 
monitoring and controlling.  
 DG ECHO should consider funding of humanitarian demining through the UN system 
(and in particular of UNMAS) in cases such as Lebanon where the UN is present with 
capacities prior, during and after the humanitarian crisis.  
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APPENDIX 1 – TERMS OF REFERENCE 
 
Regional evaluation of EC-funded mine actions in the Middle East 
2002-2007 
 
1. BACKGROUND 
 
In 2001 the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament adopted two Regulations on the 
reinforcement of the EU response against Antipersonnel Landmines (APL).104 These (referred to 
collectively as “the Regulation”) laid the foundation of the European integrated and focused 
policy.  
 
Article 13, paragraph 1 of the EC Regulation states that: The Commission shall regularly assess 
operations financed by the Community in order to establish whether the objectives of the 
operations have been achieved and to provide guidelines for improving the effectiveness of future 
operations. 
 
The APL Regulation goes on to state: Every three years after entry into force of this Regulation, 
the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament an overall assessment of all Community 
mine actions… (Article 14) 
 
The EC Mine Action Strategy and Multi-annual Indicative Programme, 2005-2007105 further 
specifies that “more specific, geographic, evaluations of EC-funded mine actions, analysing the 
results and their impact” will be undertaken to complement the overall assessment. 
 
To implement these provisions, the EC: 
 
3. Commissioned a global assessment of EC mine policy and actions over the period 2002-
2004; 
4. Entered into an agreement with The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD) to, inter alia, manage the programme of regional evaluations to identify lessons 
learned within EC-funded mine action projects in the following regions:106 
 
• Africa • Caucasus-Central Asia • Latin America 
• Asia-Pacific • Europe • Middle East 
 
                                                     
104
 Regulation (EC) 1724/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 
concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, 
p.1) and Regulation (EC) 1725/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 
2001 concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in third countries other than developing 
countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.6). The provisions are similar and we quote from Regulation 
(EC) 1724/2001. 
105
 This is the second strategy and multi-year indicative programme since the adoption of the EC 
Regulation: the first covered the period 2002-04.  
106
 Additional objectives of the EC-GICHD Agreement are to: 
• provide a repository and dissemination service for reports from mine action evaluations 
and similar studies; 
• train people from mine affected countries in evaluation; 
• support the participation of key players from mine-affected countries in official meetings 
relating to the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT). 
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The Report from the Global Assessment was issued in March 2005,107 while the agreement with 
the GICHD was concluded in December that year.  
 
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE EVALUATION 
 
The general objective of the Global Assessment was to determine to what extent the objectives 
and means set in the APL Regulation had been complied with and used in terms of strategy, 
programming, commitments and implementation. The regional evaluations will complement the 
Global Assessment by focusing on (i) relevant conclusions and recommendations from the 
Global Assessment, and (ii) EC mine action strategy and programming issues at the country 
level. Thus, the evaluation will not assess the efficiency, effectiveness, and impact of individual 
projects, except to illustrate changes since the Global Assessment or critical programming issues.  
 
Overall objective:  
 
To provide systematic and objective assessments of EC-funded mine actions in the Middle East 
to generate credible and useful lessons for decision-makers within the EC, allowing them to 
improve the planning and management of existing and future mine action projects, programmes, 
and policies. 
 
Specific objectives:  
 
− To assess the relevance of EC-funded mine activities vis-à-vis: 
o the geographic and thematic priorities defined in the Strategies for 2002-2004 and 
2005-2007; 
o national and regional needs, strategies, and priorities; 
o EC Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programmes for mine-affected 
countries in the Middle East 2002-2006; 
o EC strategy documents for the Middle East  
− To analyze the allocation of EC funds among mine-affected states in the Middle East, and 
across the various components of mine action (survey, clearance, MRE, etc.);108 
− To assess the effectiveness of EC-funded mine action support in: 
o addressing the landmine & UXO problems in mine-affected partner countries 
o fostering national ownership and the development of local capacities; 
o supporting the overall development and rehabilitation priorities/ programmes of the 
beneficiary countries;  
o supporting local mine action organisations; 
− To assess the coordination among the EC and other agencies supporting mine action in a 
country (regional; national; UN; donors; international NGOs; etc.); 
− To assess the impact of deconcentration on the planning and delivery of EC support to mine 
action in the Middle East, including the capacity of EC delegations to assess proposals for 
mine action projects and to monitor/evaluate the implementation of these projects; 
− To assess the adequacy of the EC national strategies and plans, and the effectiveness of 
implementation; 
− To assess the existence of an ‘exit strategy’ for the country to graduate from donor assistance 
(including plans for sustainability); 
                                                     
107
 Gasser, Russell and Robert Keeley, Global Assessment of EC Mine Policy and Actions: 2002-
2004. 
108
 This question addresses, among other issues, the fact that “Commitment to the Mine Ban 
Treaty” is one of the criteria listed in the EC Mine Action Strategy 2005-2007 for determining 
geographic allocations.  
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− To assess the linkages between mine action and other issues, such as humanitarian 
assistance, development, and armed violence reduction 
− To assess the impact of the end of the specific budget line for anti-personnel landmines and 
the introduction of the new “stability instrument” on future mine action support from the EC 
to the Middle East; 
− To make recommendations to improve the identification, design, and implementation of EC-
funded mine projects; 
− To generate recommendations to enhance the opportunities for cross-fertilization among 
mine action programmes in the Middle East and globally. 
 
Expected results 
 
The evaluation report shall give an overview of EC mine action support to the Middle East, and 
to particular mine-affected countries in the Middle East, since 2002. It shall incorporate more 
detailed assessments of EC mine action support in a limited number of ‘focus country’ cases to 
illustrate and support its findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Recommendations will aim 
in particular to guide EC personnel in designing and implementing programmes of support to 
mine action that complement the actions of other actors, including national authorities, other 
donors, and UN agencies for the next years.  
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
The evaluation shall entail the following main components of work: 
 
− Preliminary Planning & Data Collection (now underway) 
 
− Desk Research 
 
− Country Missions (two of the following – to be confirmed) 
o Jordan 
o Lebanon 
o Yemen 
 
− Analysis and Reporting 
 
Country Missions 
 
As the evaluation will not focus on the performance of individual projects, Evaluation Team 
members will spend most or all of their time in capitals and major centres to meet with and 
collect documents and data from: 
 
• EC delegations 
• national authorities and officials from national mine action centres 
• UN agencies supporting mine action 
• representatives from other major donors to mine action in that country 
• representatives from mine action operators (local and international) 
• other key government officials  
• representatives from key regional organisation (where present).  
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Additional data collection 
 
Additional information will be obtained from: 
  
− Review of project documents (project proposals and contracts; mid-term and final reports, as 
well as final evaluations, monitoring reports, audit reports, etc., where available; 
− Interviews with relevant Commission officials (in Brussels);  
− Questionnaire surveys and some follow-up telephone interviews with project 
managers/implementers/recipients of EC funds and projects (Officials in other EC 
Delegations, managers of operator organizations, both in organizations’ headquarters and on 
the field, and beneficiary countries’ officials, etc.). 
− EC Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programmes. 
− National Development Plans, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, and National Mine Action 
Strategies from the focus countries 
− Relevant reports from the UN (including inter-agency assessment mission reports for mine 
action) and the World Bank 
− Recent mine action evaluations commissioned by other agencies 
− Other sources, as appropriate. 
 
4. OUTPUTS 
 
An evaluation work plan will be prepared and distributed following the preliminary planning and 
data collection stage (March 2008). 
 
A debriefing of preliminary findings and conclusions will be provided to EC officials and other 
stakeholders at the end of each country mission. 
 
Within one month of the end of the country missions, a draft report will be prepared and 
distributed to the GICHD and EC delegations for comments, and subsequently distributed to 
other stakeholders. For both comments the deadline is two weeks. 
 
A final report will be submitted to the GICHD and EC Brussels. 
 
All reports will be in English. 
 
All reports will clearly indicate on the cover page that the evaluation was financed by the 
European Union and managed by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD). The reports should display the logos of both the EU and the GICHD.109 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
109
 http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/visibility/index_en.htm. The GICHD logo shall be 
provided by the GICHD. 
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Annex 1 to the ToR 
 
Among the key conclusions of the Global Assessment were: 
 
• The need for a transparent process for determining which countries and projects will 
receive EC funding for mine action; 
• In light of ‘deconcentration’, the need to clarify “who does what” in mine action within 
the EC; 
• Request for proposal and selection processes, including: 
• The need for more high quality proposals, 
• The need to reduce the number of proposals rejected on technicalities, and 
• The need for more rigorous assessments – including technical criteria – of proposals 
and projects.  
• Contracting issues, including: 
• The need for greater contractual rigour in specifying performance requirements; 
• The need for greater clarity in defining the chains of responsibility and authority; 
• The limitations inherent in the use of non-renewable contracts issued for short 
durations. 
• All interventions should incorporate exit strategies. 
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APPENDIX 2 –PERSONS MET 
 
 
Last name, first 
name 
Organisation Title/Function Date of 
interview 
Location/by 
phone 
Abadie, Cecile European Commission Head of Section ‘Infrastructure 
and local development’ 
27.06.08 Beirut 
Abdul Radib, Ali YEMAC Deputy Director 15.04.08 Sana’a 
Alawi, Ahmed YEMAC Information Officer 15.04.08 Sana’a 
Albert, Peter 
Christopher 
DCA Operation Manager 26.06.08 Tyr, Lebanon 
Al-Jarrah, Ahmed NCDR Operation Department manager 05.05.08 Jordan 
Valley 
Andrews, Stephen British Embassy Lieutenant Colonel, Defence 
Attaché 
27.06.08 Beirut 
Breikat, Mohammad NCDR Director of the NCDR  04.05.08 Amman 
Bryant, Stephen NPA Programme Manager  04.05.08 Amman 
Christiaens, Peter European Commission Attaché, Programs Manager 27.06.09 Beirut 
Clark, Chris Mine Action 
Coordination Centre 
South Lebanon, United 
Nations 
Programme Manager 25.06.08 Tyre, 
Lebanon 
De Waele, Sandra European Commission Desk Officer Jordan 5.05.08 By telephone 
Di Martino Walter Embassy of Italy Deputy Head of Mission 14.04.08 Sana’a 
Discherl, Johannes German Government Focal Point for Mine Action 5.05.08 By telephone 
Eason, Abigal Mines Advisory Group Focal Point for EC funding 21.04.08 By telephone 
Elmund Gam, Hanne 
B. 
Danish Government Focal Point for Mine Action 8.05.08 By telephone 
Enas, Ahmed YEMAC Project Officer 15.04.08 Sana’a 
Fabbroni, Valeria FSD Programme Manager Lebanon 2.05.08 Email 
questionnaire 
Fehmi, Mohammad Lebanese Armed 
Forces, Lebanon Mine 
Action Center 
Brigade General, 
Director 
24.06.08 Beirut 
Furunes, Knut Norwegian’s People 
Aid 
Operations Manager/Programme 
Coordinator Mine Action 
Programme 
23.06.08 Beirut 
Gleeson, Andy MAG Technical Operations Manager 24.06.08 Nabatieh 
Gouzee de Harven, 
Antoine 
European Commission EuropeAid-Cooperation Office, 
Unit F 2-Central management of 
thematic budget lines 
24.04.08 Brussels 
Gross, Peter European Commission Relex DDG2, Policy Officer - 
Desk Yemen and Gulf 
Cooperation Council countries 
15.05.08 By telephone 
Hofmokl, Jan European Commission Relex F.3 Near East, Co-Desk 
Officer Lebanon 
7.05.08 By telephone 
Horrocks, David MAG Country Programme Manager 27.06.08 Nabatieh 
Horvers Mary European Commission Programme manager 13.04.08 Sana’a, 
Yemen 
Horvers, Mary European Commission Programme Manager 16.04.08 Sana’a 
HRH Prince Mired 
Raad Zeid Al-
Hussein 
NCDR Chairman of the NCDR 04.05.08 Amman 
Imad, Mona DG ECHO, Lebanon 
Office 
Programme Assistant 24.06.08 Beirut 
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Isabelle Combes DG ECHO Chef de secteur Questions 
politiques, stratégie, financements 
thématiques, DG ECHO 01 
29.07.08 By telephone 
Jensen, Uffe European Commission Programme Manager, Aidco A.2 
Middle East 
8.05.08 By telephone 
Jones, Llewelyn Mines Advisory Group Operations Manager in 
Headquarter 
21.04.08 By telephone 
Juergensen, Olaf UNDP  Chief Technical Advisor to NCDR  04.05.08 Amman 
Juergensen, Olaf UNDP CTA 06.05.08 Syrian 
Border 
Koch, Julia European Commission DG ECHO, Unit 2, Central and 
Eastern Europe, NIS, 
Mediterranean countries, Middle 
East 
17.04.08 Brussels 
Lemasson, Antoine European Commission DG ECHO, Desk Officer Yemen 17.04.08 Brussels 
Liguori, Laura European Commission DG External Relations, Unit A4-
Security Policy 
24.04.08 Brussels 
Martins, Paulo European Commission Aidco A.2. Geographical 
coordination and supervision for 
the Mediterranean and Middle-
East 
15.05.08 By telephone 
By Email 
Mikaela Neijd European Commission Programme Manager 07.05.08 Amman, 
Jordan 
Montariol, Bruno European Commission EC Delegation Lebanon 07.07.08 Email 
questionnaire 
Närvi, Jussi European Commission Premier Conseiller, Chef de 
Section Coopération 
24.06.08 Beirut 
Neijd, Mikaela European Commission Programme Manager 04.05.08 Amman, 
Jordan 
Peetermans, Michel Belgian Government Focal Point for Mine Action 9.05.08 By telephone 
Poston, Allan UNDP Chief Technical, LMAC 24.06.08 Beirut 
Rasmussen, Lene DCA Programme Manager 26.6.08 Tyre, 
Lebanon 
Reuss Michael German Embassy Deputy Head of Mission 14.04.08 Sana’a 
Robyns, Alain DG ECHO, Lebanon 
Office 
Technical Assistant 24.06.08 Beirut 
Rola, El-Solh USAID Assistant Project Manager 23.06.08 By telephone 
Ruru, Kerei Mine Action 
Coordination Centre 
South Lebanon, United 
Nations 
Chief of Operations 25.06.08 Tyr, Lebanon 
Stephen Bryant NPA Programme Manager 06.05.08 Amman 
Stoa, Jan Erik Swiss Foundation for 
Mine Action 
Operations Manager 25.06.08  
26.06.08 
Tyre and 
Nabatieh, 
Lebanon 
Ulricksen, Hanne NMFA Programme Manager 06.05.08 Amman 
Veble, Eva DanChurchAid Head of Humanitarian Mine 
Action 
15.05.2008 By 
Telephone 
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APPENDIX 3 – LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSULTED 
 
Background documents and Agency Reports 
• Gasser, Russell and Robert Keeley, Global Assessment of EC Mine Policy and Actions: 
2002-2004. 
• “Lebanese Army Pounds Fighters at Refugee Camp,” Washington Post, 3 June 2007 
• “In fight against militants, Lebanon bolstered by US, Gulf countries,” Christian Science 
Monitor, 4 June 2007. 
• Presentation MACC SL, Tyre, 19 March 2007 and Damage and Early Recovery Needs 
Assessment of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Food and Agriculture Organisation, 
November 2006 
• Counting the Cost, The economic impact of cluster munition contamination in Lebanon, 
by Greg Crowther, Landmine Action, May 2008, 
• B. Pound et al., “Departure of the Devil: Landmines and Livelihoods in Yemen,“ Volume 
1, Main Report, Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), 
Geneva, 2006 
• Mid-Term Outcome Evaluation for Strengthening National Capacity for Mine Action in 
Yemen - Phase II; GICHD, June 2005 
• Report on the use of EC contributions channelled through UNDP’s Thematic Trust Fund 
for Crisis Prevention and Recovery 6 September 2004 
• United Nations Development Programme Iraq Country Office, Progress Report February 
- August 2004, 6 September 2004, page 4 and Progress Report Progress Report February 
- November 2004, 16 November 2004 
• United Nations Mine Action Service, Annual Report 2006, New York 
• German Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Guidelines for funding humanitarian demining 
„Leitlinien zur Förderung von Projekten der humanitären Minen- und 
Kampfmittelräumung 
• durch das Auswärtige Amt“ Berlin, 18.01.2008 
• Denmark’s support to Mine Action, Strategy, October 2006 
• Sida’s Contributions to Humanitarian Mine Action Final Report Sida Evaluation 01/06 
• United Nations Development Programme Iraq Country Office Report on the use of EC 
contributions channelled through UNDP’s Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention 
and Recovery 6 September 2004 
• United Nations Development Programme Iraq Country Office Progress Report Jan-June 
2004; 14 July 2004 Mine Action Support to Iraqi National Mine Action Authority  
• United Nations Development Programme, Iraq Country Office Progress Report February 
- November 2004; 16 November 2004; Support to the National Mine action Authority 
(NMAA) in Capacity Building 
• Lebanon Mine Action Program National Demining Office, Working for a Lebanon Free 
From The Impact of Landmines, Long Term Plan 2008-2012 
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• Country Program Action Plan between the Government of the Republic of Yemen and 
the United Nations Development Programme, 2007 - 2011 
 
EC Documentation 
• European Community, The European Roadmap towards a Zero Victim Target, The EC 
Mine Action Strategy & Multi-annual Indicative Programming 2005-2007, 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/mine/docs/strategy_0507_en.pdf  
• EC Council Regulation (EC) 1724/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 23 July 2001 concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in developing 
countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.1) 
• EC Regulation (EC) 1725/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 
2001 concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in third countries other than 
developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.6) 
• European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), Regional Strategy Paper 
(2007-2013) http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_euromed_rsp_en.pdf 
• Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programs 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/index_en.htm 
• EU Cooperation Partners and Programs in Lebanon 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/country-
cooperation/lebanon/lebanon_en.htm 
• Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on 
Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD), COM (1996) 153 final of 
30.04.1996. See also, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament: Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development – An assessment, 
COM (2001) 153 final of 23.04.2001 
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APPENDIX 4 – ASSESSMENT OF COUNTRY PROGRAMS AGAINST STRATEGY OBJECTIVES 
 
 
Strategy  
Country 
Yemen Jordan Lebanon Iraq 
Strategy 2002-2004 
Overall objective 
 
To alleviate human suffering, increase 
humanitarian security while, at the same time, 
stabilising post-or frozen- conflict regions, 
recreating an environment in which people 
can live safely and economic, health and 
social development can occur free from 
constraints imposed by the hidden treat of 
mines, and ensuring that victims needs are 
addressed.  
Yemen is facing a landmines and 
ERW problem over the past thirty 
years. LIS completed in July 2000 
identified mine-affected villages in 
nineteen out of the country’s twenty-
one governorates. It recorded a total 
of 4,904 casualties over the past ten 
years were recorded, of which 2,560 
were killed and 2,344 injured. Impact 
on access to critical resources, and 
blocking access to land. Impact on 
infrastructure development and the 
implementation of social 
development projects.  
 
Conflict: no but mines were laid 
related to potential conflict with 
neighbors 
Post Conflict: Israeli invasion in 70s 
 
• Very few victims  
• Very ltd. effect on farming 
 
 
Post conflict: yes  
Israel left Lebanon and left mines 
behind 306 communities affected 
 
LIS co-funded by the EU 
 
Lebanon not in the focus of the EU; 
sporadic funding of one MAG 
intervention 
 
Human suffering: 1428 
communities affected, 
approximately 300 casualties 
per year 
Focus on local capacity as well as on 
continuing mine clearance. (After that period, 
(…), the main financial effort might focus on 
mine clearing and victim assistance.) 
National programme with focus on 
local capacity exists. 
 
 
Local capacity: Mine action was the 
responsibility of the army (Royal 
Engineers) 
Local capacity building: no, only if in 
combination with funding to MAC SL 
(needs to be checked) 
 
Victim assistance: no 
 
Structure for both local capacity and 
victim assistance was in place: 
under LMAC there is MRE and MVA 
National Steering Committee 
 
Local capacity exists partly: 
NMAA failed but IKMAC for 
Kurdistan exists 
Thematic Priorities  
1. Actions to eliminate the AP Landmine/UXO 
Threat to affected populations and the 
alleviation of its effects on them 
The government was working 
towards the elimination of the 
problem.  
Same as above Same as above Same as above 
2. Actions to create and reinforce local 
capacity and mine action efficiency and 
effectiveness 
Other actors work with the 
government in the mine action 
sector (UNDP started support in 
1999 to support the national 
capacity). 
Same as above Same as above Same as above 
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Geographic Priorities  
Priority for support will be given to countries 
severely affected by the scourge of APL/UXO, 
which made and are making significant efforts 
to join the Mine Ban Treaty. Due attention will 
be given to populations of non-signatory 
countries. When aid is provided to non-Mine 
Ban Treaty signatories, the impact of the 
assistance on the country’s willingness to 
accede will be taken into consideration for 
future support.  
The government of Yemen is 
committed to the complete 
elimination of landmines and 
explosive remnants of war. The 
Government signed the Anti-
Personnel Mine Ban Convention in 
1997 and ratified it in September 
1998, the first country in the Middle 
East region to do so. 
Severely affected: no 
 
APMBC: Yes 
Lebanon not signatory to APMBC Severely affected: yes 
Countries severely to moderately affected by 
APL/UXO problem 
About 48-72 accidents annually. See above LIS shows high, medium and low 
impacted communities (28 
communities were rated high) 
See above 
Countries/territories moderately to lightly 
affected with concentration of the threat in 
areas of high risk for the populations and/or 
for the socio-economic development 
 
See above Same as above Same as above 
Prioritisation of the problem within the national 
framework (complementarity with geographic 
or other horizontal resources or reinforcement 
of the capacity of the geographic resources or 
compensation for the absence of those 
resources) 
The National Mine Action Committee 
(NMAC) was established in 1998 
and formulated a national mine-
action strategy. The Yemen 
Executive Mine Action Centre 
(YEMAC) was established in 1999 
as the implementing body of the 
NMAC with the primary responsibility 
of coordinating all mine-action 
activities in the country. 
 
National framework: NCDR  Yes, national plans exist (check 
again) 
 
Weak national framework but 
regional frameworks exist 
(Kurdish part) 
Strategic importance for the EU (proximity to 
EU or political context or relation to already 
started assistance programmes which are 
blocked by pending mine issues.)  
EU country strategy focuses on 
private sector development, food 
security, poverty reduction, good 
governance, democracy and respect 
of human rights.  
 
Many EU MS were funding UNDP 
for the support of YEMAC (Italy, 
France, Belgium, Netherlands, UK, 
Germany, Sweden + non EU donors 
such as US, Canada, UAE).  
Check when the national committee 
was created 
Lebanon falls within the EU 
Neighborhood policy (presented in 
2003)  
Others? 
 
Before crisis in 2006 Lebanon was 
not much in the focus of donors 
(check EU overall budgets for 
Lebanon  in periods) 
 
check if other countries do as well 
No strategic importance for the 
EU 
Cross cutting priorities (eg. tackle 
humanitarian crisis, facilitate rapid 
interventions) 
DG ECHO finances humanitarian 
programmes.   
- No Large scale humanitarian 
needs and funding.  
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Strategy 2005-2007 
 
Strategic Objective 
To drastically reduce the lingering threat and 
impact of landmines in the context of 
increased local security and regional 
confidence. 
Regarding threat and impact see 
above.  
No. ECHO and subsequent funding did 
drastically reduce threat and impact 
of cluster ammunition in the South. 
No funding to clearing of landmines.  
Local security: yes 
Regional confidence: - 
Human suffering: 1428 
communities affected, 
approximately 300 casualties 
per year. 
Thematic Objectives 
To reduce the Anti-personnel Landmine 
Threat (MRE, detection, marking, fencing, 
clearance, destruction of stockpiled APL). 
Regarding threat and impact see 
above.  
Yes. Yes. Threat from APL: yes, see 
above. 
To Alleviate Mine Victim Suffering and Aid 
Socio-Economic Reintegration (Supporting or 
creating local victim assistance services). 
Regarding threat, impact and 
suffering see above. 
No. No. Suffering and need for socio-
economic reintegration is 
given.  
To Enhance Local and Regional Impacts of 
Effective Mine Action Capacity (support to 
national/local) mine action structures, LIS). 
National Mine Action Capacity: 
NMAC, YEMAC. 
Yes. Funding to international NGOs incl. 
capacity building but it is limited to 
individuals. (check with FSD) 
Funding to UNDP is capacity 
building with LMAC and some future 
local NGOs.  
Structures are weak but exist in 
some parts of the country.  
Geographic Priorities     
Commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty. Yes, see above. Commitment is given Lebanon is not signatory Commitment  is given.  
High Humanitarian and Development Need. Development need: yes 
Humanitarian funding: yes 
 
If yes, then development need.  
As country does not have very much 
fertile area the cleared area is of 
importance.  
 
Humanitarian: yes in 2006 and 2007 
Development need: South yes 
Rest of the country: not clear. 
High humanitarian need is 
given.  
Strategic Importance for the EU. No - ENP: yes 
Besides: yes 
Important case for the signatory 
process of the cluster treaty.  
 
No strategic importance for the 
EU. 
Sustainability and Coherence with Wider 
Assistance. 
EU strategy is focuses good 
governance and poverty alleviation 
(in particular health).  
Mine Action is not mentioned in any 
CSP or NIP.  
 
- Yes, cluster would have blocked the 
South entirely and would have 
hampered overall assistance to the 
country.  
Assistance is provided by other 
donors and actors. 
Proven Commitment of Non-States Parties to 
Mine Action and the Principles of the APMBC. 
Yes, see above. N.a.  Lebanon is still not signatory but the 
government is keen to get rid of the 
problem and not to produce more 
mines and to get rid of the stockpile.   
Commitment exists but state 
parties partly fail. 
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Efficiency and Effectiveness of Local/National 
Mine Action Planning Programmes. 
Yes, see above. Yes. Strong local set up incl. UN and 
Army exists in the South.  
Set up with Army and UNDP exists 
for the rest of the country.  
Local/National Mine Action 
Planning Programmes are 
weak. 
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APPENDIX 5 – OPEN INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Evaluation criteria 
 
General Evaluation questions Specific Evaluation Questions 
Relevance 
The extent to which the aid activity 
is suited to the priorities and 
policies of the target group, 
recipient and donor. 
 
• To what extent are the objectives of the 
programme still valid? 
• Are the activities and outputs of the 
programme consistent with the overall goal 
and the attainment of its objectives? 
• Are the activities and outputs of the 
programme consistent with the intended 
impacts and effects? 
 
• What are the national and regional needs, strategies, and 
priorities in terms of mine action?  
• How are these needs assessed? 
• What are the geographic (regional?) and thematic priorities 
defined in the EC Strategies for 2002-2004 and 2005-
2007? 
• What is the allocation of EC funds among mine-affected 
states in the Middle East, and across the various 
components of mine action (survey, clearance, MRE, etc.)? 
• How adequate is the process for determining which 
countries and projects will receive funding? 
• How transparent is the process of determining funding? 
Effectiveness 
A measure of the extent to which an 
aid activity attains its objectives. 
 
• To what extent were the objectives achieved / 
are likely to be achieved? 
• What were the major factors influencing the 
achievement or non-achievement of the 
objectives? 
 
• To what extend were the landmine & UXO problems in 
mine-affected partner countries addressed? 
• To what extend were national ownership and the 
development of local capacities fostered? 
• To what extend were the overall development and 
rehabilitation priorities/ programmes of the beneficiary 
countries supported?  
• In how far were local mine action organisations supported? 
Which ones? Through which Implementation Channels? 
Compare strength/weaknesses of NGOs vs. Government 
vs. UN. 
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• In how far did the process of deconcentration and the 
question of who does what in mine action within the EC 
impact on the planning and delivery of EC support to mine 
action in the Middle East, including the capacity of EC 
delegations to assess proposals for mine action projects 
and to monitor/evaluate the implementation of these 
projects (incl. an assessment of technical understanding of 
EC Delegation staff)?  
• To what extend did the end of the specific budget line for 
anti-personnel landmines and the introduction of the new 
“stability instrument” impact on future mine action support 
from the EC to the Middle East; How does the introduction 
of the European Neighbourhood Policy influence funding in 
mine action? 
• In how far did contracting issues influence the 
achievement of the objectives (contractual rigour in 
specifying performance requirements, clarity in defining 
chains of responsibility and authority, limitations inherent in 
the use of non-renewable contracts issued for short 
durations)? 
• How do implementing partners see the collaboration with 
the EC? How important is the EC as a funding 
organization? How do they perceive the contractual 
arrangements, supervision and reporting? 
Efficiency 
Efficiency measures the outputs -- 
qualitative and quantitative -- in 
relation to the inputs. It is an 
economic term which signifies that 
the aid uses the least costly 
• Were activities cost-efficient? 
• Were objectives achieved on time? 
• Was the programme or project implemented in 
the most efficient way compared to 
alternatives? 
• In how far has the process of requiring and selecting 
projects as well as contracting have an influence on the 
timely delivery of activities? 
• Are there alternative ways of funding and would there be 
more cost efficient? 
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resources possible in order to 
achieve the desired results. This 
generally requires comparing 
alternative approaches to achieving 
the same outputs, to see whether 
the most efficient process has been 
adopted. 
 
Impact 
The positive and negative changes 
produced by a development 
intervention, directly or indirectly, 
intended or unintended. This 
involves the main impacts and 
effects resulting from the activity 
on the local social, economic, 
environmental and other 
development indicators. The 
examination should be concerned 
with both intended and unintended 
results and must also include the 
positive and negative impact of 
external factors, such as changes 
in terms of trade and financial 
conditions. 
 
• What has happened as a result of the 
programme or project? 
• What real difference has the activity made to 
the beneficiaries? 
• How many people have been affected? 
 
• What is the impact of the programme or project and how 
much of the change can be attributed to the EU funding 
• What real difference has the activity made to the 
beneficiaries (change in number of victims, access to land, 
statements of perception of security, etc)? 
• Did the changes have any influence on the conflict/the 
reconstruction process/ development process? 
 
Sustainability 
Sustainability is concerned with 
measuring whether the benefits of 
an activity are likely to continue 
after donor funding has been 
• To what extent did the benefits of a 
programme or project continue after donor 
funding ceased? 
• What were the major factors which influenced 
the achievement or non-achievement of 
• In how far did the EC foresee and plan for an ‘exit 
strategy’ for the country to graduate from donor assistance 
(including plans for sustainability); 
• In how far is the end state clearly defined and commonly 
agreed between actors. In how far is there sufficient 
data/the situation known to define an exit strategy (survey)? 
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withdrawn. Projects need to be 
environmentally as well as 
financially sustainable. 
sustainability of the programme or project? 
 
• In how far is the exit strategy linked to impact (risk to leave 
before all risk areas are cleared); 
• In how far does the strategy foresee/link up with long-term 
challenges (development, land rights and land disputes, 
etc.) 
• In case of humanitarian demining, who does the concept of 
Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development-LRRD? 
Which elements in EU funding are in favour of LRRD and 
which ones do hamper them? What would be alternatives? 
Coherence/Complementarity/ 
Coordination 
The need to assess security, 
developmental, trade and military 
policies as well as humanitarian 
policies, to ensure that there is 
consistency and, in particular, that 
all policies take into account 
humanitarian and human-rights 
considerations. 
This criterion may have several dimensions: 
 
1) Coherence within the Commission's development 
programme 
• Example: Can it be said that the activities and 
outputs logically allow the objectives to be 
achieved? Are there contradictions between 
the different levels of objective? Are there 
duplications between the activities? 
2) Coherence/complementarity with the partner 
country's policies and with other donors' interventions 
• Example: Can it be said that there is no 
overlap between the intervention considered 
and other interventions in the partner country 
and/or other donors' interventions, particularly 
Member States? 
3) 
1) Specific activity vs. overall objective 
• Activity vs. Ottawa convention/Mine Ban Treaty 
• Activity vs. humanitarian objectives 
2) EC intervention vs. other actors intervention (partner country, 
other EC member State) 
• What are other actors’ interventions related to Mine Action? 
• In how are these interventions taken into account in EC’s 
planning and implementation? 
• Is there overlap, influence, or duplication? 
• To what extend did the intervention add benefits to what 
would have resulted from Member States' interventions only 
in the partner country. To what extent has the sharing of 
roles between the EC and Member States contributed to 
optimise the impact of the support? 
3) EC Mine Action objective vs. other EU objectives 
• What are the EU objectives on regional and national level? 
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Coherence/complemehttp://www.worldvision.org/ntarity 
with the other Community policies 
• Example: Is there convergence between the 
objectives of the intervention and those of the 
other Community policies (trade, agriculture, 
fishing, etc.)? 
4) Coordination among the EC and other agencies 
supporting mine action in a country (regional; national; 
UN; donors; international NGOs; etc.) 
• In hare far are they taken into account in EC’s Mine Action 
planning and implementation? 
• Is there any positive/negative influence? 
• Influence of EU reform on Mine Action: Under which Pillar 
comes Mine Action (first or second)? How is non-
geographic funding possible under new instruments? 
4) Coordination 
• What are the coordination mechanisms related to Mine 
Action? What is the role of MACs? How do they fulfill their 
role and what is influencing it? 
• What role does the EC play in these coordination 
mechanisms? 
• In how far are EC interventions influenced by these 
coordination mechanisms? 
 
